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Chinese military and diplomatic actions in the South China Sea (SCS) are often seen as 
risky and provocative to other nations in the region that could lead to wider conflict. 
International relations scholars and China specialists debate the significance and causes 
of Chinese behavior in the SCS and the relationship of this peripheral territory to China’s 
place in the international system. 
This thesis attempts to contribute to the debate by evaluating whether Chinese 
behavior in the SCS may be explained by the balance-of-risk theory developed by Jeffrey 
W. Taliaferro in Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery. This theory 
utilizes defensive realism and prospect theory to explain decisions by leaders to engage in 
risky military and diplomatic actions in peripheral region. In Balancing Risks, which was 
published in 2004, Taliaferro argues leaders refuse to accept losses to their relative power 
and will continue to pursue risk acceptant strategies in order to maintain a perceived or 
real status quo. The questions asked by this thesis are: does Chinese behavior follow the 
balance-of-risk hypotheses? If so, what are the implications of balance-of-risk theory for 
our understanding of Chinese actions in the SCS? And, what does the balance-of-risk tell 
us about policy response during crisis? 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Chinese military and diplomatic actions in the South China Sea (SCS) are often 
seen as risky and dangerous, and threaten to provoke responses from the other nations of 
the region that could lead to wider conflict. International relations scholars and China 
specialists debate the significance and causes of Chinese behavior in the SCS, and 
relationship of this peripheral territory to China’s place in the international system. This 
thesis attempts to contribute to the debate by evaluating if Chinese behavior and focus on 
the SCS may be explained by the balance-of-risk theory developed by Jeffrey W. 
Taliaferro. This theory utilizes defensive realism and prospect theory to explain decisions 
by leaders to engage in risky military and diplomatic actions in peripheral regions that 
pose no direct threat. Taliaferro argues leaders refuse to accept losses to their relative 
power, and will continue to pursue risk acceptant strategies in order to maintain a 
perceived or real status quo. The questions asked by this thesis are: does Chinese 
behavior follow the balance-of-risk hypotheses? If so, what are the implications of 
balance-of-risk theory for our understanding of Chinese actions in the SCS? And, what 
does the balance-of-risk tell us about policy response during crisis? 
B. BACKGROUND 
In May 2014, Chinese oil rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 (HD-981), with approximately 
80 supporting naval and surveillance ships, began an exploration mission in contested 
waters of the SCS.1 HD-981’s deployment caused clashes at sea, the sinking of a 
Vietnamese fishing vessel, and anti-Chinese protests in Vietnam that resulted in the 
burning of Chinese factories; it also brought international attention back to the 
                                                 
1 Carl Thayer, “4 Reasons China Removed Oil Rig HYSY-981 Sooner than Planned,” The Diplomat, 
July 22, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/4-reasons-china-removed-oil-rig-hysy-981-sooner-than-
planned/. 
 2 
territoriality disputes throughout the SCS.2 The SCS features a history of militarized 
conflict based on maritime security and expressed in the form of territorial disputes over 
the maritime rights to exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and continental shelves. 
Disputes manifest around competition over fishery and energy resources, the freedom of 
navigation, sea lines of communication, and naval modernization.3 The SCS has 
traditionally been an important seaway; the Council on Foreign Relations reports that sea 
lanes provide the avenue for 5.3 trillion dollars of trade annually—1.2 trillion of which is 
United States (U.S.) trade—and the International Energy Agency projects 90 percent of 
Middle Eastern fossil fuels will enter Asia via these sea-lanes by 2035.4 While undersea 
oil and natural gas estimates vary, the U.S. Energy Information Administration projects 
reserves of over 11 billion barrels of crude oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas 
exist throughout the entire SCS.5 Access to fisheries also been framed by disputants as a 
“human front line” that represents economic value, an avenue for governments to 
legitimize territorial claims, and a mobilizer of nationalism.6 Philippine fisheries’ exports 
to China reached 129 million dollars in 2013; but from 1995 to 2014, 42 Chinese vessels 
and 640 Chinese fishermen were held by the Philippine’s province of Palawan for 
poaching.7 Incidents involving the arrest of fishermen in disputed waters are often a 
                                                 
2 Trefor Moss, “TV Shows China Ship Ramming Another Vietnamese Vessel Near Oil Rig,” Wall 
Street Journal, June 3, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/vietnam-tv-shows-chinese-vessel-ramming-
another-ship-near-oil-rig-1401811550; Jack Simpson, “Footage Released of Large Chinese Ship Chasing 
and Sinking Small Vietnamese Fishing Boat in Disputed Waters,” The Independent, June 6, 2014, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/footage-released-of-large-chinese-ship-chasing-and-
sinking-small-vietnamese-fishing-boat-in-disputed-waters-9501386.html; Euan McKirdy, “Protestors 
Torch Factories in Southern Vietnam as China Protests Escalate,” CNN, May 15, 2014, 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/14/world/asia/south-china-sea-drilling-duplicate-2/index.html. 
3 M. Taylor Fravel, “Maritime Security in the South China Sea and the Competition Over Maritime 
Rights,” in Cooperation From Strength: The United States, China and the South China Sea, eds. Patrick 
Cronin and William Rogers (Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, 2012), 34–36. 
4 “China’s Maritime Disputes,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-
pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/. 
5 Ibid.; “Contested Areas of South China Sea Likely Have Few Conventional Oil and Gas Resources,” 
U.S. Energy Information Administration, April 3, 2013, http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id= 
10651. 
6 Michael Fabinyi, “China and the South China Sea Resource Grab,” The Diplomat, February 22, 
2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-and-the-south-china-sea-resource-grab/. 




catalyst for another underlying issue facing regional disputes: nationalism.8 Chinese 
President Xi Jinping used this sentiment to enact regional fishing regulations in 2013, 
which claims Hainan Provence controls over 2,000,000 square kilometers of the SCS.9 
Beginning in 2006, regional tensions increased leading up to the 2009 deadline to the 
United Nations (UN) Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) whose 
goal was to delineate maritime boundaries; however, tensions have not advanced to 
militarization and typically involve diplomatic crises surrounding territorial claims and 
incidents associated their resources.10 
Historically, the SCS is a peripheral region with a waxing and waning geopolitical 
importance; but it has always played a prominent role in Chinese foreign relations, and 
recent Chinese behavior has reignited territorial disputes and reopened the debate as it the 
regions importance to China, the Southeast Asian states, and the international 
community. To understand the background of the disputes in the SCS, it is important to 
address the underlying causes. This chapter will breakdown the current status of the 
claims in the SCS, explore the history of claims, disputes, and conflicts in the SCS, and 
identify the role of Chinese nationalism in perpetuating disputes. 
1. The Status of the South China Sea 
The SCS can be broken down to include the Scarborough Shoal and four groups 
of features—islands, shoals, reefs, banks, sands, cays, and rocks: the Pratas Islands 
(Dongsha qundao in Chinese), the Paracel Islands (Xisha qundao in Chinese and Hoang 
Sa in Vietnamese), the Spratly Islands (Nansha qundao in Chinese and Truong Sa in 
                                                 
8 M. Taylor Fravel, “Territorial and Maritime Boundary Disputes in Asia,” in Saadia Pekkanen, 
Rosemary Foot, and John Ravenhill, The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 3. 
9 Economy, “China’s Imperial President.”; Carl Thayer, “China’s New Fishing Regulations: An Act of 
State Piracy?” The Diplomat, January 13, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/chinas-new-fishing-
regulations-an-act-of-state-piracy/.; Taylor Fravel, “Hainan’s New Fishing Rules: A Preliminary Analysis,” 
The Diplomat, January 10, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/hainans-new-fishing-rules-a-preliminary-
analysis/. 
10 Fravel, “Maritime Security,” 36. 
 4 
Vietnamese), and the Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha qundao in Chinese).11 The current 
statuses of the Scarborough Shoal and four major groups are presented in Figure 1. 
                                                 
11 Tilman Pradt, “Smoldering Conflicts in the South China Sea,” ASIEN: The German Journal on 




Figure 1.  Map depicting SCS claims and nine-dashed line (2014)12 
 
                                                 
12 Michael McDevitt, The South China Sea: Assessing U.S. Policy and Options for the Future (CNA 
Occasional Paper) (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, November 4, 2014), ii, https://www.cna.org/ 
research/2014/south-china-sea. 
 6 
a. Scarborough Shoal 
The Scarborough Shoal is the largest atoll in the SCS and reef and rocks features 
form a largely submerged triangle-shaped chain.13 Both the Philippines and China claim 
the atoll, and control has shifted between the two states. At this time, China effectively 
controls the Scarborough Shoal by maintaining a presence of naval or coast guard 
vessels.14 
b. The Pratas Islands 
The Pratas Islands are under the control of Taiwan. China maintains the only 
other claim on the Pratas Islands.15 
c. The Paracel Islands 
The Paracel Island archipelago is under the control of China. The People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) gained control of the eastern Amphitrite Group from the 
Republic of China (ROC) during the Chinese civil war, but the other Spratly Island 
features were under Vietnamese control. China achieved sole control over the western 
islands after defeating the Vietnamese in the 1974 Battle of the Paracel Islands. Vietnam 
and Taiwan dispute China’s claim of the Paracel Islands.16 
d. The Spratly Islands 
The Spratly Islands include 230 features and are occupied by five states and are 
claimed in whole or in part by six states: China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, 
Malaysia, and Brunei. China, Vietnam, and Taiwan maintain sovereignty claims over the 
entirety of the Spratly Island features, the Philippines claims 53 features, Malaysia claims 
                                                 
13 Mark E. Rosen, Philippine Claims in the South China Sea: A Legal Analysis (CNA Occasional 
Paper) (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, August 2014), 7, https://www.cna.org/sites/default/ 
files/research/IOP-2014-U-008435.pdf. 
14 Ibid., 8. 
15 Pradt, “Smoldering Conflicts,” 63. 
16 Ibid., 63–64; M. Taylor Fravel, “Growing Competition in the South China Sea,” in The Long 
Littoral Project: South China Sea, eds. Michael A. McDevitt, Taylor Fravel, and Lewis M. Stern 
(Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, March 2013), 38, http://taylorfravel.com/documents/ 
research/fravel.2013.CNA.competition.SCS.pdf. 
 7 
12 features, and Brunei claims territorial seas and an EEZ which reaches the waters in the 
Spratly Islands.17 Taiwan was the first claimant, and it occupied the largest island, 
Taiping Island, since 1956.18 China first established control over a Spratly Island 
territory during the 1988 Johnson South Reef Skirmish with Vietnam, and it quickly 
established military outposts on Subi Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, Johnson 
South Reef, and Chigua Reef.19 Malaysia first established a position in the Spratly 
Islands in 1983 at Swallow Reef, and it occupies six islets including structures on 
Investigator Shoal and Erica Reef.20 The Philippines first took control of five islands 
after Tomas Cloma and his followers occupied some islets off of the Philippine 
archipelago in 1974.21 The Philippines claims a collection of 53 features known as the 
Kalayaan Island Group (KIG).22 In 1995, China moved in on Philippine claimed 
Mischief Reef and occupied the feature.23 In the 1990s, the Philippines grounded the 
Sierra Madre on the Second Thomas Shoal, and it maintains its claim by stationing 
forces on the wreck.24 Vietnam first took control of six Spratly Islands in the 1970s, and 
has increased its possessions to 27.25 These possessions include Spratly Island, which 
holds facilities including a 600 meter runway, and Southwest Cay, an island that 
Vietnamese troops seized in 1975 while the Philippine garrison was visiting Northeast 
Cay.26 
                                                 
17 Fravel, “Growing Competition,” 39. 
18 Ibid., 39. 
19 Ibid.; Pradt, “Smoldering Conflicts,” 64–65. 
20 Pradt, “Smoldering Conflicts,” 65. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Rosen, Philippine Claims, 18–19. 
23 Pradt, “Smoldering Conflicts,” 65. 
24 Thomas Etzler, “Wrecks, Rats, and Roaches: Standoff in the South China Sea,” CNN, July 2014, 
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2014/07/world/south-china-sea-dispute/. 
25 Pradt, “Smoldering Conflicts,” 65. 
26 Ibid.; Manuel Mogato and Nguyen Phuong Linh, “Philippine, Vietnamese Troops Drink Beer, Play 




Figure 2.  Map depicting occupied Spratly Islands features (2012)27 
e. Macclesfield Bank 
The Macclesfield Bank is a completely submerged chain of reefs. The area is 
claimed by the Philippines, Taiwan, and China.28 
2. A Historical Perspective of South China Sea Claims 
Modern claims to the SCS date back to April 23, 1930 when France announced 
the annexation of the Spratly Islands.29 After France took physical possession of the 
Spratly Islands on April 7, 1933, the Republic of China protested French claims, the ROC 
                                                 
27 “Territorial Claims in South China Sea,” image, New York Times, May 31, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/05/31/world/asia/Territorial-Claims-in-South-China-
Sea.html?_r=0. 
28 Ronald O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving 
China: Issues for Congress (CRS Report No. R42784) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
April 22, 2015), 2, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf. 
29 Leszek Buszynski, “The Development of the South China Sea Maritime Dispute,” in The South 
China Sea and Australia’s Regional Security Environment (National Security College Occasional Paper 
No. 5), eds. Leszek Buszynski and Christopher Roberts (Acton, Australia: National Security College, 
Australian National University, September 2013), 5, http://nsc.anu.edu.au/documents/occasional-5-brief-
1.pdf. 
 9 
Land and Water Maps Inspection Committee formed in 1933.30 The committee’s mission 
was to survey, name, and produce maps depicting all of the islands under Chinese 
sovereignty in the SCS, and the U-shaped line map was drawn in 1935.31 
In December 1939, Japanese naval forces claimed and occupied the Pratas, 
Paracel, and Spratly Islands basing submarines on Itu Aba Island.32 After the defeat of 
the Japanese during World War II, the San Francisco Conference was convened to 
determine the sovereignty of territory conquered by Japan. Article 2(f) declared, “Japan 
renounces the right, title, and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands;” but 
competing sovereignty claims by the excluded PRC Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai on 
August 15, 1951 and Vietnamese envoy Tran Van Huu on September 7, 1951 resulted in 
the conference leaving the area “res nullius” (nobody’s property).33 This left the Pratas, 
Paracel, and Spratly Islands without definite sovereignty, and created the conditions that 
led to the modern territorial disputes. 
Each of the claimants in the SCS bases their claims on different factors. The 
Vietnamese base their claims on inherited sovereignty from France, which was granted at 
the decolonization enforced by the Geneva Conference of 1954.34 The Philippines draw 
their claims from Tomas Cloma’s settlement in the Spratly Islands that he called 
Kalayaan (Freedom Land), and the Philippines expressed this claim on July 10, 1971 
with a subsequent presidential decree on June 11, 1978 renaming the group Kalayaan 
Island Group.35 The Malaysian claim was a reaction to Marco’s presidential decree and 
occupation of KIG, which it considered a part of its own claim.36 The Malaysian claim 
                                                 
30 Buszynski, “South China Sea Maritime Dispute,” 6; Erik Franckx and Marco Benatar, “Dots and 
Lines in the South China Sea: Insights from the Law of Map Evidence,” Asian Journal of International 
Law 2, no. 1 (January 2012), 90–91, doi: 10.1017/S2044251311000117. 
31 Franckx and Benatar, “Dots and Lines,” 90. 






was proclaimed by a map published in 1979.37 Brunei’s claim is limited to an EEZ that 
overlaps with Malaysia’s.38 
China bases its claim off of the Zhou Enlai’s objection to the San Francisco 
Conference and the official ROC U-shaped line map. Zhou’s declaration was the PRC’s 
first claim, “the Xisha Islands and Nanwei Dao [Spratly Islands] are inherently Chinese 
territory, just like the whole of the Nansha Islands, Zhongsha Islands and Dongsha 
Islands. They fell during the war of aggression waged by Japanese imperialists, but were 
fully recovered by the then Chinese Government upon Japan’s surrender.”39 The U-
shaped map, based on the earlier draft findings of the Land and Water Maps Inspection 
Committee, was produced in 1947 by the ROC’s Department of the Territories and 
Boundaries of the Ministry of the Interior and made up the second portion of the Chinese 
claim.40 The U-shaped line map originally contained eleven dashes and encompassed the 
better part of the SCS with its mid-sea features starting at the Sino-Vietnamese boarder, 
passing through the Gulf of Tonkin, separating Vietnam from the Paracel and Spratly 
Islands, passing the James Shoal to the South, then moving northeast separating Borneo 
and The Philippines from the Spratly Islands, and finally separating The Philippines from 
the Chinese mainland and Taiwan.41 Figure 3 depicts the original U-shaped line as 
created by the ROC’ Department of the Territories and Boundaries of the Ministry of the 
Interior entitled: “Map of the South China Sea Islands.”42 
                                                 
37 Buszynski, “South China Sea Maritime Dispute,” 6. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Zhiguo Gao and Bing Bing Jia, “The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and 




40 Franckx and Benatar, “Dots and Lines,” 90–91. 




Figure 3.  Map of the South China Sea Islands (1947)43 
After the PRC took control of the government of mainland China in 1949, the 
PRC adopted a similar position to that of the ROC. In 1953 a map of the South China Sea 
that featured nine dashes—the dashes in the Gulf of Tonkin were removed as a 
concession to Vietnam—was used to depict PRC claims in the SCS.44 
After suggesting that some of the Nansha Islands “should” belong to the 
Philippines in 1956, the PRC issued a statement that repeated the proclamation by Zhou 
Enlai from August 15, 1951. The PRC followed the repeated statement with the 
Declaration on the Territorial Sea on September 4, 1958, and this declaration is one of the 
                                                 
43 “Map of South China Sea Islands,” map, 1947, U.S. Department of State (DOS), Bureau of Oceans 
and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Limits In The Seas No. 143, China: Maritime 
Claims in the South China Sea (Washington, DC: Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and 
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, December, 5, 2014), 2, http://www.state.gov/ 
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foundations of China’s modern maritime claims.45 The 1958 Declaration on China’s 
Territorial Sea, adopted at the 100th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress, provides one of the clearest delineation of the Chinese claim: 
1. The breadth of the territorial sea of the People’s Republic of China shall 
be twelve nautical miles. This provision applies to all territories of the 
People’s Republic of China including the Chinese mainland and its coastal 
islands, as well as Taiwan and its surrounding islands, the Penghu Islands, 
the Dongsha Islands, the Xisha Islands, the Zhongsha Islands, the Nansha 
Islands and all other islands belonging to China which are separated from 
the mainland and its coastal islands by the high seas. 
2. China’s territorial sea along the mainland and its coastal islands takes as 
its baseline the line composed of the straight lines connecting bas-points 
on the mainland coast and on the outermost coastal islands; the water area 
extending twelve nautical miles outward from this baseline is China’s 
territorial sea. The water areas inside the baseline, including Bohai Bay 
and the Chiungchow Straits, are Chinese inland waters. The islands inside 
the baseline, including Tungyin Island, Kaoteng Island, the Matsu Islands, 
the Paichuan Islands, Wuchiu Island, the Greater and Lesser Quemoy 
Islands, Tatan Island, Erhtan Island and Tungting Island, are islands of the 
Chinese inland waters. 
3. No foreign aircraft and no foreign vessels for military use may enter 
China’s territorial sea and the air space above it without the permission of 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China. 
4. While navigation Chinese territorial sea, every foreign vessel must 
observe the relevant laws of the People’s Republic of China and 
regulations of its government. 
5. The principles provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) apply also to Taiwan 
and its surrounding islands, the Penghu Islands, the Dongsha Islands, the 
Xisha Islands, the Zhongsha Islands, the Nansha islands, and all other 
islands belonging to China. 
6. The Taiwan and Penghu areas are still occupied by the United States 
armed force. This is an unlawful encroachment on the territorial integrity 
and sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China. Taiwan, Penghu and 
such other areas are yet to be recovered, and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China has the right to recover these areas by all 
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suitable means at a suitable time. This is China’s internal affair, in which 
no foreign interference is tolerated.46 
The 1958 Declaration became the basis of the 1992 Law on the Territorial Sea 
and the Contiguous Zone that added the Senkaku Islands to China’s claim, the 1996 
Declaration on the Baselines of the Territorial Sea that delineated geographic points from 
the tip of the Shandong peninsula along the mainland coast to the western cape of Hainan 
island as well as around the Paracels, and the 1998 Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone 
and the Continental Shelf.47 Combining the 1992, 1996, and 1998 laws provides the basis 
for China’s claims in the SCS until 2009. 
3. The Role of Nationalism in South China Sea Disputes 
The SCS disputes were nationalized as part of the early 1990s Communist Party 
of China (CPC) propaganda campaign called guaqing jiaoyu (education in the national 
condition), which became the foundation for modern Chinese state sponsored 
nationalism.48 Guaqing jiaoyu contained three overriding themes: Chinese historic 
traditions, the territorial integrity of the state, and national unity, and it forms the 
backbone to state nationalism which Zhao argued “stresses political-territorial 
convergence” with the expressed desire to “maintain the boundaries of the existing 
nation-state with its territory and population.”49 While Zhao believed there were two 
other forms of nationalism in china, liberal and ethnic, state nationalism forms the basis 
for foreign policy and it has taken on a pragmatic nature that is largely “a situational 
matter and essentially contextual, whose content is continually reconstructed to fit the 
needs of its creators and consumers.”50 Zhao argued that modern Chinese leaders 
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maintain this pragmatism except in cases that “involve China’s vital interest or trigger 
historical sensitivities.”51 This characterization of Chinese nationalism fits within M. 
Taylor Fravel’s findings on Chinese concessions in territorial disputes, discussed in the 
next chapter, which noted Chinese sovereignty over the SCS is complicated by the duel 
claim of Taiwan.52 The Taiwanese claim nationalizes disputes because any resolution 
including concessions would threaten the legitimacy of the CPC’s claim to ruling 
China.53 
The history of China and its interactions with the West’s Westphalian nation-state 
system also affected the disputes in the SCS. The clash of Chinese universalism with 
Western imperialism caused a cultural crisis in China, and the Chinese nation-state was 
forced to borrow the ideas of nationalism to help its transformation into the international 
system.54 Zhou argued the systemic factors of globalization, the nation-state, and 
imperialism “conditioned, if not dictated, the various nationalist roles” available for the 
Chinese elites and the emphasis on territorial sovereignty created a mythology that was 
embodied by the Chinese nation-state.55 Territory became a symbol of the mythic 
“century of humiliation,” and the CPC was able to build on this to link state survival to 
the Chinese people as a nation through the survival of the Party.56 These linkages have 
placed a significant importance on territorial integrity in the SCS, and as discussed in the 
next section, China has only made one territorial maritime concession. 
The link of maritime territorial integrity and nationalism has recently displayed 
itself in a new ways. One of the recent expressions of nationalism in the SCS appears 
innocuous was adding a watermark map of China that includes the nine-dashed line to its 
eighth page; however, this act illustrates regional sensitivities to Chinese nationalism as 
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Vietnamese border officials refused to stamp the page, the Philippines and Taiwan 
presented formal complaints, and India stamps its own version of the map on that page of 
Chinese visitors.57 Robert Ross presents a more problematic manifestation of Chinese 
nationalism: the aircraft carrier. Ross argued that the pursuit and construction of an 
aircraft carrier was the result of “prestige strategies” based on naval nationalism.58 In his 
argument, Ross points to Chinese nationalism claiming widespread demand for the 
construction of aircraft carriers and a blue water navy because they are traditional 
symbols of great power status.59 Embarrassed by the inability to respond to the 2004 
Indonesian tsunami, Ross argued proponents of the air craft carrier program use two 
arguments to justify their beliefs: “explicit demand for status,” and a “pseudo national 
interest argument,” which both cited the need to secure sea lanes and respond to crisis.60 
Regardless of justification, the building of an aircraft carrier is a shift in the hard military 
power relationship that could undermine the peaceful rise of China. The passport and 
aircraft carrier program are just two examples of how Chinese nationalism can affect the 
disputes in the SCS. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The background to disputes in the SCS is based on the San Francisco 
Conference’s inability to resolve territorial claims, but it is complicated by nationalism, 
geopolitics, and a militarized history. The growing tensions from these factors and the 
assertive behavior of China caused U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to declare “the 
future of geopolitics will be decided in Asia” as she announced the American pivot to the 
Pacific.61  
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In a move that looks like “forward deployed diplomacy,” the U.S. recognized the 
significance of the economic, geo-political, and territorial relationships in the SCS and 
made it imperative that scholars and policy makers understand the behavior of the 
region’s major player—China.62 This thesis evaluates if the balance-of-risk hypothesis 
helps further the academic debate and if it helps policy makers understand Chinese 
behavior in the SCS. Balance-of-risk theory applies defensive realism to prospect theory 
to evaluate decisions by Chinese leaders. If the theory is substantiated, the findings 
should help scholars and policy makers understand Chinese military and diplomatic 
strategies in the SCS. 
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II. SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES 
In surveying the literature that addresses the behavior of China in international 
relations, two major questions appear: is China rise in power peacefully, and is China 
assertive? As each international relations theory emphasizes different factors and their 
interpretation, answers from realists, economic interdependence theorists, neorealists, 
British School theorists, or analytic game theorists do not provide a consensus opinion. 
Theorists who value international institutions do not tend to view China as overly 
assertive and maintain the possibility of a peaceful rise, while realism based theorists tend 
to view China as assertive and unable rise peacefully. These overarching theories are 
important because their implications drive policy decisions; however, each view point 
differs on what drives China’s behavior, so an examination of the competing theories 
helps contextualize where the balance-of-risk theory fits into the bigger picture. This 
chapter will survey the literature to present a range of potential answers to its basic 
research question: what explains Chinese behavior in the SCS? 
A. DEFINITIONS 
It is useful to begin with this section by defining the relevant terms and what they 
mean for China. According to Barry Buzan, a rising power is defined as a state that sees 
the growth of its power in absolute and relative terms in respect to the other participants 
of the international system.63 The peaceful rise of China includes the growth of power 
without precipitating any major hostilities between China, its neighbors, or other world 
powers. A non-peaceful rise includes conflicts between China, its neighbors, or another 
world power as a dominant feature of the growth in power. With respect to the 
international order, China can be viewed as revisionist, detached, or status quo. 
Revisionist states can be further broken down by whether a state desires to change its 
status in the international system, or whether a state desires to reform the structure and 
institutions that form the international system.64 Detached states do not participate in the 
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international system and as an active participant in the global and regional institutions 
that make  up the international system, such as the UN, World Bank, Association of 
South East Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF) or the Asian-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation; China is not a detached state.65 A status quo state can be defined as a state 
that accepts both its place in the international system and the structure of the system 
itself.66 
Michael Swaine argues that assertive behavior is ambiguous term and problematic 
to define because it “means different things to different people.”67 An increased and 
active Chinese role in international institutions, deliberate efforts at revising international 
norms, or challenges to national interests or policies of the U.S. in forms ranging from 
verbal statements to official actions have all been used to prove assertive Chinese 
behavior.68 Swaine argues that the broad range of actions should be limited to behavior 
that distinguishes official or governmental sanctioned words and actions that are 
confrontational, destabilizing, or threatening, and the threshold should be high enough to 
exclude unofficial actions or “utterances.”69 Swaine terms Chinese behavior that is 
productive or creative forms of assertiveness as “positive activism,” and should not be 
viewed as assertive because of its negative connotations.70 Fravel adds depth to the 
definition with the argument that assertiveness requires “new and unilateral actions to 
change the status quo.”71 This thesis will adopt Swaine and Fravel’s threshold in defining 
assertive behavior as officially sanctioned new and unilateral actions, policies, or 
statements that are confrontational, destabilizing, or threatening. 
                                                 
65 Buzan, “China in International Society,” 16–17; “The World Factbook: China,” Central Intelligence 
Agency, last modified May 15, 2015, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ 
ch.html. 
66 Buzan, “China in International Society,” 16–17. 
67 Michael D. Swaine, “Perceptions of an Assertive China,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 32 (2011), 
1–2, http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/CLM34MS.pdf. 
68 Swaine, “Perceptions of an Assertive China,” 2. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Fravel, “Maritime Security,” 41. 
 19 
B. PERSPECTIVES ON A RISING CHINA 
The international relations literature on the rise of China provides arguments for a 
peaceful rise, a conflict based rise, and even that China has not yet started its rise. This 
section will review arguments from economic interdependence theory, the British School 
theory, game theory, and neorealist theory perspectives. These perspectives each present 
alternative ways to understand Chinese behavior. 
1. A Case for a Peaceful Rise 
Richard Rosecrance argues that the current economic, political, and military 
relationships formed by the globalization of world markets will usher in a peaceful rise of 
China. Rosecrance believes the catalyst will be the growth of the domestic market formed 
by a Chinese middle class that will number around 400 million in the near future.72 
Following the American example, China will participate in zones of economic 
competency and will need the products and markets of other states regardless of the size, 
strength, or capabilities of its military.73 Rosecrance’s view is based on the shift of 
economic growth away from land and capital, and towards human capital a segment of 
the world economy that now accounts for 64 percent of world gross domestic product.74 
Additionally, the markets of China’s neighbors in Japan, the Koreas, India, and Russia all 
make any external territorial expansion unlikely because it would upset the development 
via economic growth approach in favor of a development via military expansion. 
Buzan argues that the peaceful rise of China is a two-way process in which China 
accepts and participates in the structures and institutions of the international system, and 
other world powers accommodate China by adjusting the structures and institutions to the 
new status of powers.75 Buzan’s view expresses the English School theory and its 
principal idea of the international society.76 In the English School, primary institutions 
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(international) and players (states) both evolve and define behavior that is acceptable, and 
contestation over primary institutions is one of the forces behind the international 
society.77 In this view, a peaceful rise of China is accomplished by both China and the 
international society working together to create the conditions necessary to avoid 
conflict.78 With this in mind, China was only ready to enter into engagement with the 
international society on a non-revolution basis in the 1980s, and it has transformed its 
interests from a political-territorial zero sum struggle to a status quo power that accepts 
the international society on an ideological level.79 Buzan views China as a “good citizen” 
at the regional level sharing traditional Westphalian views on sovereignty, non-
intervention, regime security, the preservation of culture, and a commitment to 
development through trade and investment.80 Globally, Buzan recognizes that China is 
not yet considered to be a “good citizen,” yet his major conclusion is that a peaceful rise 
is possible. The conditions of this rise is a revisionist China that reforms the international 
system by constructing a regional society based on “Asian Values” that embraces a 
pluralist Westphalian view, a liberal market based economic system that favors mutual 
development and interdependence, and repairs relationships with potential spoilers in 
Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea.81 
Samuel Wu and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita addressed the dispute in the SCS from 
a game theory perspective, and argue that China’s rise will not include a return to 
militarization. Their findings were based on rational actor model where states consist of 
competing interests that try to shape policy that achieve a compromise between enhanced 
security and specific policy or ideological goals.82 While the research noted an increase 
in Chinese power and the buildup of Chinese military capabilities, it argued that the 
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PRC’s main policy objective of economic reform and development remains the top 
priority. The conclusion of Wu and Mesquita, drawn from Mesquita’s proprietary model, 
was that China is “not prepared to risk such a level of military engagement [military 
engagement to solve territoriality disputes in the South China Sea] at this time.”83 Wu 
and Mesquita expressed confidence in this model based on the robust results from a wide 
variety of stakeholders and their power, preferences, and salience.84 While this game 
theory perspective is dated, originally published in 1994 and it does not account for the 
changing geopolitical position of China, China has not deviated from its policy of 
economic reform and development. Despite maintaining consistent policies for growth 
and development, China’s geopolitical changes have affected its foreign policy and the 
model should be updated to account for those changes. 
2. A Case for the Rise Causing Conflict 
John Mearsheimer presents the neorealist argument and argued “to put it bluntly: 
China cannot rise peacefully.”85 Mearsheimer rejects many of the arguments that attempt 
to determine if China is a status quo power or a revisionist state, rather he focuses on the 
uncertainty of intensions and the inability of rival powers to determine the objectives of 
the Chinese military. Chinese military actions, building a blue water navy, projecting 
power to the second island chain, and the far sea defense strategy, are perceived as 
actions that indicate “Beijing is bent on aggression.”86 Citing World War I as an 
example, Mearsheimer also rejects interdependence as having a significant effect on 
geopolitics. His focus is on a rising China that will try to dominate the Asia-Pacific 
region as a hegemon; because for neorealists like Mearsheimer, hegemony provides the 
“ideal situation” for any state and it is likely the only way that China can maintain “core 
interests,” such as reintegrating Taiwan into the Chinese state.87 In the neorealist view, 
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U.S. is likely to attempt to contain China like it behaved towards the Soviet Union during 
the Cold War, and the resulting potential security competition between China and the 
U.S. has a “considerable potential for war.”88 
3. A Case Arguing China Is Not Yet Rising 
Sheena Chestnut and A. Iain Johnston counter the consensus opinion that China is 
actually rising. Chestnut and Johnston define the rising power of a state as its changes 
compare to the capability of the hegemon, and in the case of China, the U.S. is the 
hegemon in question.89 In order to measure the change in relative power between China 
and the US, Chestnut and Johnston examined “capabilities as a percentage of the 
dominant state’s, and the absolute difference between the dominant state’s capabilities 
and those of weaker challengers.”90 For China to be considered rising, its capabilities 
must be increasing as a percentage of the U.S. and the absolute gap between China and 
the U.S. must be getting smaller.91 Chestnut and Johnston did not find that China had 
reached the point where both percentage and absolute differences indicate that China is 
rising in relation to the US.92 For gross domestic product (GDP), military spending, and 
science, technology, and information integration all show percentage gains; however, the 
U.S. actually expanded its absolute advantages in each of these categories.93 
Interestingly, the implications of the perception of a rising China from Chestnut and 
Johnston’s findings appear to have little effect on the overall discourse of Chinese foreign 
policy. 
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4. Applying the Broader Theories to Chinese Behavior in SCS 
Just as there are debates over the larger questions interpreting the behavior of a 
rising China, international relations literature on Chinese foreign policy in the SCS 
debates the assertiveness of Chinese behavior. Scholars argue that assertive Chinese 
behavior is meant to upset the status quo, while behavior that maintains the status quo is 
used as evidence against any new assertiveness. This section will review arguments on 
whether Chinese behavior in the SCS is assertive or not. 
a. A Case Arguing Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea 
Michael Yahuda’s argument that China is newly assertive in the SCS is based on 
four developments: a shift in the balance of power in China’s favor, the inclusion of the 
SCS and its trade routes as a national interest, the growth of the People’s Liberation 
Army Navy’s (PLAN’s) power to exercise China’s claims, and the increased nationalists 
sentiment amongst both the public and officials from the PRC.94 Yahuda pointed to the 
China’s 11th Ambassadorial Conference in 2009, the Party’s Central Work Conference on 
Foreign Affairs, which adjusted Deng Xiaoping’s famous maxim, “keep a low profile and 
achieve something” (taoguang yanghui, yousuo zuowei) to “uphold (jianchi) keeping a 
low profile and actively (jiji) achieve something” signaling the shift towards a more 
assertive diplomatic policy.95 In this context, using naval assets in the 2009 USNS 
Impeccable incident to exercise the Chinese held view of limiting surveillance in their 
EEZ is a reflection of their growing power and the weakening power of the U.S. in the 
wake of the global financial crisis. 
Carlyle Thayer presented the most compelling argument of actions that meet the 
threshold for assertiveness. He argued that China displayed assertive behavior through a 
“pattern of aggressively asserting sovereignty claims” by “targeting the commercial 
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operations of oil exploration ships” in areas disputed by Vietnam and the Philippines.96 
Thayer cited 2011 incidents with Chinese patrol boats and the Motor Vessel (MV) 
Veritas Voyager, a survey ship operating in Reed Bank off of the Philippine’s Palawan 
Island, the Binh Minh 02, a survey ship operating off of Vietnam’s central coast, and the 
Viking II, a seismic survey ship operating around Vanguard Bank.97 In each of these 
occasions Chinese vessels maneuvered dangerously close to the vessels, and in the case 
of the Binh Minh 02 and Viking II they attempted to cut the ships surveying cables.98 
Thayer also called the decision in 2011 to expand Hainan’s annual unilateral fishing ban 
to three months in length and include international fishermen as well as the 2013 
expansion from the Paracels to the entire SCS assertive behavior, which was backed up 
with South Sea Regional Fisheries Administration Bureau (SSRFAB) patrols that 
threatened and detained Vietnamese fishermen.99 
b. A case Arguing China Is not Assertive in the South China Sea 
Swaine and Fravel took up the argument that it is not clear that China has 
displayed assertive behavior in the form of significant negative unilateral policies or 
actions in the SCS.100 As mentioned earlier, Fravel points to the consistency of Chinese 
maritime and sovereignty claims and the continued demilitarization of the disputes as the 
major argument against assertive behavior. Swaine and Fravel contend that the increase 
in the capabilities and patrols of its Coast Guard, SSFRAB, and Maritime Surveillance 
Force (MSF) are only a response to the way other states have challenged China’s 
claims.101 They also referenced earlier U.S. and PLAN interactions, USNS Bowditch and 
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the EP-3 incidents, as evidence that China has signaled the desire that the U.S. and other 
nations do not conduct surveillance in their claimed waters.102 
Fravel argued that instances that stand out as Chinese assertiveness in the SCS are 
limited. Fravel cited the Viking II cable cutting incident as a unilateral and harmful action 
that stands out as newly assertive. Additionally, he argued that the best indicator of an 
increase in Chinese assertiveness would be a shift from civilian agencies to PLAN naval 
forces in confrontations with civilians from a disputant state. While the scholarly 
literature does not form a consensus on Chinese assertiveness in the SCS, Fravel and 
Swaine provide a benchmark from which to test incidents and behavior. 
C. CONCLUSION 
While the literature on Chinese behavior is broad in both scope and depth, this 
thesis will investigate one particular area of Chinese behavior—actions in the SCS. The 
recent rise in tensions over the territorial disputes in the SCS present an opportunity to 
test the balance-of-risk theory and determine if Chinese foreign policy has followed a 
similar path as other Western powers. The international relations literature provides a 
variety of different Western perspectives on Chinese behavior, but in the SCS views of 
behavior appear to follow the paradigm of assertiveness in realist based theories versus 
cooperation in institutional based theories. Within this context, the rise of China is 
threatening or beneficial depending on your viewpoint, and disputes in the SCS are the 
driving force behind competition or cooperation. This thesis uses balance-of-risk theory 
to explain Chinese behavior, and determine if the rise of China is a threat of conflict or an 
opportunity for cooperation. 
If balance-of-risk theory can explain Chinese behavior in the SCS, then it may 
help further the argument that Chinese behavior does fit within the scope of Western 
international relations theory. This development could be extrapolated to understand 
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other Chinese behavior outside of the SCS. Observations, such as Fravel who observed 
Chinese leaders avoid visiting disputed territory in the SCS and use civilian agencies to 
exercise sovereignty to limit any escalation or militarization of the disputes, could be 
used by international relations scholars to understand Chinese behavior, and in Fravel’s 
case it would mean leaders signal their intensions through the actions by the level of 
leadership or agencies that respond to crisis.103 
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III. BALANCE-OF-RISK THEORY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In testing the balance-of-risk theory on the case of Chinese behavior in the SCS, 
this thesis will adapt the four hypotheses that Taliaferro set forth in Balancing Risks: 
Explaining Great Power Involvement in the Periphery. If the hypotheses are confirmed, 
this thesis should be able to prove Chinese behavior followed a predicted set of patterns. 
In order to establish the patterns of Chinese behavior and evaluate the balance-of-risk 
hypotheses, this paper will review the balance-of-risk theory’s components of defensive 
realism and prospect theory, identify the balance-of-risk theory’s variables, present 
evidence of a change in Chinese after 2006 that proves or disproves each of the four 
balance-of-risk hypotheses, and draw conclusions regarding China’s behavior in the SCS. 
B. BALANCE-OF-RISK THEORY 
Balance-of-risk theory is made up of two components: prospect theory and 
defensive realism. Prospect theory is not a theory of foreign relations, rather it is a 
behavioral model for decision making under risk. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 
developed the theory in 1979 in response to observations that people continually violated 
the tenants of expected utility theory. Kahneman and Tversky theorized people make 
decisions not based not on the rational model of expected utility theory, but around a 
reference point that frames their choice as a gain or loss. Their theory posits that 
individuals evaluate decisions based on an expectation level, will overvalue losses 
relative to comparable gains (loss aversion), and will value what they have more than 
comparable things which they do not have (endowment effect). So, individuals will be 
risk averse in choices amongst gains, but risk acceptant in choices among losses. In stable 
situations, the status quo often serves as the reference point from which individuals make 
their decision, but other influences—expectation levels, aspirations, social norms, or 
recent losses—can affect the reference point. In dynamic situations, individuals will 
renormalize their position after making a gain, but will maintain the old status quo as a 
reference point after taking a loss (instant endowment effect). In this situation, 
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individuals will engage in risk-acceptant behavior to return to the previous reference 
point. Additionally, if an individual frames a decision around the current status quo, they 
will view any costs of moving away from the status quo as a loss and the benefits as a 
gain, overvalue the loss, undervalue the gain, and therefore they typically remain at the 
status quo (status quo bias).104 
However, because prospect theory is a behavior model, a broader model of 
international relations must accompany it in order to provide explanations for political 
behavior. Balance-of-risk theory assumes the basic beliefs of defensive realists such as 
Charles Glaser, John Herz, and Stephen Van Evera. It accepts the following basic tenets: 
that states are the central actors, that the world is anarchic, that states seek to maximize 
their security or power, and that the international system is mostly responsible for state 
conduct in the international arena. Defensive realism argues that the international system 
provides incentives for moderate or restrained behavior, that security is potentially 
available for all states in the system because most states will accept the status quo (status-
quo bias), that the security dilemma is based on inadvertent behavior based on status quo 
powers’ inability to recognize their situation with a potential security partner state, that 
aggressor states are uncommon but hard to distinguish from potential security partners, 
and that incentives for state expansion only exist under particular circumstances.105 
Balance-of-risk theory diverges from defensive realism at two key points. First, it places 
an emphasis on the role of leaders and the complexity of foreign policy making, and like 
Hans Morgenthau and Arnold Wolfers argue, it assumes an indirect linkage between 
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power or interests and actual policy.106 The second divergence, the recognition that 
human beings have a limited capacity to process information, explains the indirect 
linkage of power or interests and actual policy. As humans have a limited mental 
capacity, Taliaferro argues that they will rely on “cognitive short cuts” to assess 
situations and select policies, and certain psychological tendencies bias their decisions, 
such as those described by prospect theory: loss aversion, endowment effect, instant 
endowment effect, etc.107 
The usefulness of combining prospect theory and defensive realism is found in 
their complementary nature. The defensive realist literature has yet to fully explain the 
status-quo bias of states, and Taliaferro introduces prospect theory as a decision making 
model that helps to explain the presence of the status-quo bias.108 Levy discussed the 
status quo bias as the common observation: states are often willing to fight to defend 
lands that they would not have been willing to capture in the first place.109 In this 
example, balance-of-risk theory is able to use its divergence from defensive realism’s 
rational actor model to explain how foreign policy decisions are developed and 
implemented that do not fit within traditional defensive realism. 
The most difficult aspect of applying balance-of-risk theory is determining the 
reference point from which states, or individual leaders, frame their decisions.110 Mercer 
notes that political psychologists use one or more of five determinants to understand how 
an individual frames a decision: status quo as reference point, aspiration as reference 
point, heuristics, analogies, or emotion.111 In the balance-of-risk theory, Taliaferro 
suggests that decision makers assess outcomes in relation to an expectation level, rather 
than a neutral reference point based on the status quo.112 He argues that analysis of a 
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state’s perception of relative power, international standing, or status is the most useful 
method for determining the state’s framing of a reference point.113 When assessing 
relative power, international standing, or status leaders frame their reference point, and it 
is made evident through “planning documents, white papers on national security goals 
and strategies, public pronouncements, instructions to subordinates, and diplomatic 
communications.”114 If a state’s position is facing gains relative to other states, it will set 
the current status quo as the reference point; however, if a state is facing or has 
experienced relative losses, it will aspire to return to the previous relative status and set 
that as its reference point.115 Taliaferro also suggests that heuristics can be taken into 
account to help to determine how long, and in what conditions, a state will maintain an 
aspirational reference point based on a previous relative status.116 Renormalization and 
the endowment effect explains that states will quickly adjust to a new status quo as a 
reference point if it reflects relative gains, while states will hold on to aspirational 
reference points (known as anchoring) in the domain of losses.117 The longer a state 
maintains a particular reference point, the harder it will be for that state to renormalize a 
relative loss.118 
1. Balance-of-Risk Thesis 
In testing the balance-of-risk theory on the case of Chinese behavior in the SCS, 
this paper expands on the four hypotheses that Taliaferro set forth in Balancing Risks: 
Explaining Great Power Involvement in the Periphery: 
a. Hypothesis One (H1) 
The perception of senior officials about relative power trends influences the 
choice of a common expectation level. If decision makers anticipate a diminution of 
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relative power or status over time, they are more likely to adopt a more favorable 
international environment as their expectation level. Conversely, if officials anticipate a 
relative increase in power and status over time, they are more likely to adopt the status 
quo as the expectation level. 
b. Hypothesis Two (H2) 
Senior officials’ ability to revise their expectation level in response to adverse 
outcomes will be directly proportional to the length of time they adhere to a particular 
expectation level. The longer officials adhere to a common expectation level, the less 
likely they will be to revise that expectation level downward in response to adverse 
policy outcomes. 
c. Hypothesis Three (H3) 
Senior officials are more likely to initiate or persevere in risk-acceptant strategies 
in the periphery to avoid perceived losses. Conversely, senior officials are less likely to 
initiate in, or persevere, risk acceptant strategies in the periphery to secure perceived 
gains. 
d. Hypothesis Four (H4) 
Senior officials will likely continue and even escalate their commitment to risk 
acceptant but failing intervention strategies in the periphery. Therefore, senior officials 
are unlikely to reassess, scale back, or terminate ongoing risk-acceptant strategies.119 
e. Null Hypothesis (NH) 
Senior officials will adopt an invariant risk acceptance level, despite changes to 
relative power, expectation levels, the length of time expectation levels are maintained, or 
the success/failure of on-going strategies. 
These four hypotheses were developed based on the independent variable, 
“anticipated changes in relative power, international standing, or status (over time),” 
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represented by a relative gains or losses of the factors; an intervening variable, “leaders 
selection of an expectation level,” represented by the framing of a reference point; and a 
dependent variable, “the variation in leader’s risk taking,” represented by risk adverse or 
risk acceptant behavior.120 Risk acceptant behavior is defined as actions, or lack of 
actions, may result in “serious losses resulting from great power’s own behavior, 
adversary or third party reactions, or other exogenous events.”121 For this thesis, the 
definition of Chinese risk acceptant behavior is based off of Swaine and Fravel’s 
definition of assertiveness—new and unilateral behavior or words that are sanctioned by 
the government, that are confrontational, destabilizing, or threatening, and whose goal is 
to change the status quo. The definition fits within the scope of Taliaferro’s, as actions 
that meet the definition could destabilize the region, and potentially lead to conflict. This 
definition will maintain a threshold above unofficial actions or ‘utterances’ from officials 
that may not be sanctioned by the government. 
2. Balance-of-Risk Applied to the South China Sea 
If the hypotheses are correct, this thesis should be able to prove that Chinese 
behavior should follow the pattern: 
a. Applied Hypothesis One 
Chinese leaders have anticipated a decrease in relative status in the SCS, and they 
should frame a favorable reference point. Chinese leaders should illustrate a national 
interest in increasing relative and hard power. 
b. Applied Hypothesis Two 
China has maintained consistent claims since Zhou Enlai’s 1951 declaration, so 
Chinese leaders should reject any renormalization—readjustment to a new less desirable 
reference point—that provides a territoriality outcome outside of the anchored reference 
point. 
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c. Applied Hypothesis Three 
In the anticipation of losses, Chinese leaders should intervene against challenges 
in the SCS, and those interventions should include behaviors that are risk acceptant and 
outside of the standards of behavior and inter-state interaction set forth in international 
agreements. 
d. Applied Hypothesis Four 
Chinese behavior should show reluctance from disengaging from conflicts or 
risky behavior in the periphery, despite diminishing returns. 
e. Applied Null Hypothesis 
Chinese leaders should maintain a static risk acceptance level in the SCS, despite 
changes to relative power, expectation levels, the length of time expectation levels are 
maintained, or the success/failure of ongoing strategies. 
In order to prove or disprove each of the four hypotheses, this thesis will provide 
evidence to prove or disprove each of the four hypotheses developed by the balance-of-
risk theory for China’s behavior in the SCS. The first hypothesis will use the expectations 
of Chinese leaders to establish the reference point, from which the subsequent hypotheses 
draw their conclusions. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
In expanding the discussion Taliaferro set forth in Balancing Risks: Great Power 
Intervention in the Periphery, this thesis uses a qualitative case study methodology. The 
case study mechanism allows for the examination of causal relationships and the testing 
of an established hypothesis. The data for the case study consists of white papers, 
scholarly articles, intelligence reports, and media reports. The secondary literature on 
Chinese international relations will be heavily relied upon, as access to primary 
documents—from transcripts of high-level meetings, private correspondence, to internal 
government documents—is limited at this time. The decision to study Chinese actions in 
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the SCS was an attempt to expand Taliaferro’s theory while maintaining the rigor of case 
choice.122 
The criteria Taliaferro used to determine his cases were: first, the case must 
represent a significant event; second, the case must have enough data to ensure within-
case comparison; third, the case must represent a variation in the factors that allegedly 
affect risk taking in the periphery; and fourth, the case must contain a large within-case 
variation to the dependent variable.123 This thesis argues the 2009 United Nations 
Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) CLCS deadline, which will be examined in 
the next chapter, represents a watershed moment for China’s claims in the SCS. Chinese 
behavior in the SCS from 2006 leading up to the 2009 deadline and until 2015 provides a 
rich data set of important events that can be compared to trends of Chinese behavior from 
the 1990s until 2006. The variations in the factors that affect risk acceptance are the 
challenges to the status of China’s claims in the SCS—these include challenges presented 
by oil and fishery resource recovery and international law by 2009 UNCLOS CLCS 
decisions in the wake of the 2008 International Court of Justice (ICJ) judgment between 
Singapore and Malaysia—and the in-case variation to the dependent variable is 
represented by the changing trends in risk acceptant Chinese behavior.124 
In order to establish a method for testing the balance-of-risk hypothesis, 
Taliaferro established “a causal connection between officials’ perceptions of gains and 
losses (relative to their expectation level) and their risk-taking behavior.”125 Additionally, 
the balance-of-risk hypothesis is supported if the following conditions occur: 
First, decision makers must evaluate outcomes in terms of the expectation 
level adopted at T. Second, decisions makers must perceive themselves as 
facing gains or losses relative to that expectation level at T + N. Third, the 
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aggregate risk taking behavior of officials must be in the predicted 
direction: risk acceptance for loss and risk aversion for gain.126 
In the case of Chinese behavior in the SCS, for the theory to be proven true 
evidence must support an adopted Chinese expectation level, the Chinese perception of 
losses or gains from their expectation level, and risk behavior that follows Taliaferro’s 
prediction of risk acceptance for loss and risk aversion for gain. The next chapter will 
identify two distinct periods in Chinese foreign policy towards the SCS, and it will 
present the framework necessary to test the applied versions of Taliaferro’s hypotheses. 
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IV. A HISTORY OF CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
Beginning in 2006, Chinese behavior became more assertive and risk acceptant 
and 2009 marks a watershed point where assertive Chinese behavior deviated from a 
historical period of demilitarization. The history of modern conflict in the SCS can be 
broken into a two periods: the first period includes the Cold War that is highlighted by 
militarized conflict over maritime disputes, and the second period is from the end of the 
Cold War until the present that features the demilitarization of disputes. The end of the 
Cold War marked a significant geopolitical change which defined a new era in Chinese 
foreign relations. The collapse of the Soviet Union reduced the threat of conflict, and the 
resolution of the Mischief Reef incident was an early example of China’s emergence as a 
secure state willing to work in cooperation with its regional partners to de-escalate 
incidents. In 2009 UN CLCS required disputing claimants to formally declare their 
maritime claims, and this brought a renewed geopolitical importance to the disputes over 
EEZs and natural resources to the demilitarized period. This chapter will provide a 
history of conflict in the SCS, address the implications of UNCLOS CLCS, explore how 
Chinese leadership over the maritime domain evolved, and investigate settled Chinese 
territorial disputes in order to create a framework for testing the balance-of-risk 
hypotheses as a potential explanation for the change in Chinese behavior. 
A. A HISTORY OF MILITARIZED CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH CHINA 
SEA 1945–1992 
Disputes over the of islands in the SCS were declared shortly after the San 
Francisco Conference failed to determine the sovereignty of the region, but China’s 
militarization of the disputes did not occur until the geopolitics in the Cold War altered 
the position of China. After the souring of relations between the United Soviet Socialist 
Republic (USSR) and China, Chinese leaders feared the potential of a Vietnamese shift 
towards the USSR.127 Relations between Beijing and Hanoi grew strained following 
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China’s rapprochement with the United States, and the potential threat from the North 
Vietnamese granting Soviet access to the Paracel Islands, weakly controlled by the South 
Vietnamese, prompted China’s militarization of the dispute.128 After the Paris Peace 
Accords in 1973 reduced American military assistance to South Vietnam, rapprochement 
promised American non-involvement, and an increase in Soviet naval presence in the 
Pacific, Central Military Commission (CMC) chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou 
Enlai directed CMC vice chairman Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping to personally 
supervise an operation to take the Paracel Islands.129 On January 16, 1974, four Hainan 
class fast attack craft and two mine sweepers moved from a position in Amphitrite Group 
in the eastern Paracels that it had occupied since 1956, to support two Chinese fishing 
vessels that were testing a reduction of South Vietnamese garrisons in the Crescent 
Group but were rammed by a South Vietnamese destroyer.130 On January 17 and 18, the 
Vietnamese naval forces consisting of three destroyers and one corvette came in close-
proximity with the Chinese while maneuvering around the Crescent Group, and a fire 
fight erupted on January 19 as Vietnamese troops attempted to reclaim Duncan Island 
from Chinese forces that had occupied the island.131 Without the support of the American 
Navy at the Battle of the Paracels on January 19 and 20, Chinese naval forces supported 
by air forces from Hainan Island easily defeated the South Vietnamese forces and 
removed their presence from the Paracel Islands.132 By pushing the Vietnamese out of 
the Paracel Islands, Beijing achieved a national objective and pushed Moscow’s forces 
several hundred miles further south from its southern border. 
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In reaction to the Battle of the Paracels, North Vietnamese forces began 
occupying features in the Spratly Islands between April 11 and 22, 1975.133 This 
occupation prompted numerous engagements between Chinese and Vietnamese naval 
forces from 1979 to 1982 during the Sino-Vietnamese War, and China moved half of its 
North Sea Fleet to the south, began apprehending Vietnamese surveillance vessels and 
crewmembers, and conducting its first air patrols and naval surveys by 1983.134 From 
May 16 to June 6, 1987 China launched its first large scale naval patrol of the Spratly 
Islands, and began a major effort to establish a permanent position by building 
observation towers and structures on Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, Johnston Reef, 
Cuarton Reef, Gaven Reef, and Dongment Jiao.135 The occupation of features in the 
Spratly Islands caused the second major naval engagement between Vietnam and China 
on March 14, 1988. Garver presented the Chinese account, which says that two naval 
freighters accompanied an amphibious landing ship that deployed troops on Johnson 
Reef, and claims that the Vietnamese opened fire, despite warnings from Chinese troops 
stationed on the reef.136 PLAN ships joined the skirmish, and it resulted in the sinking of 
one Vietnamese freighter, heavy damage to the other two ships, three Vietnamese 
casualties, nine prisoners, and 74 missing sailors.137 Militarized tensions in the Spratly 
Islands continued as both Vietnam and China embarked on a military buildup through the 
early 1990s; however, without the geopolitical threat of Soviet encirclement, the 
settlement of the Cambodian conflict, and the setbacks of the Tiananmen massacre, China 
adopted de-escalatory rhetoric to ease tensions.138 
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B. A HISTORY OF DEMILITARIZED CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH CHINA 
SEA 1992–2014 
The history of the demilitarized conflict in the SCS has two distinct periods. The 
first period begins at the end of the Cold War and continues until the beginning of 2006; 
after 2006, the geopolitical landscape of the SCS shifted again. The UN CLCS deadline 
in 2009 brought a renewed interests in the disputed territory as the value of islands and 
land features increased, based on their potential respective EEZs and contiguous zones, 
and behavior in the region changed. This section breaks the demilitarization of conflicts 
two periods featuring two different trends in Chinese behavior. 
1. Demilitarization from 1992–2006 
Militarized disputes in the SCS during the 1970s and 1980s continued until the 
end of the Cold War changed China’s geopolitical perspective for the next four years. 
Chinese Premier Li Peng proposed a joint development of the Spratly Islands, and 
China’s delegate to Bandung, Wang Yingfan, recommended the establishment of an 
“appropriate mechanism or organization” to explore international cooperation.139 The 
international situation dictated the Chinese de-escalation, and the 1995 Mischief Reef 
incident was the first example of the emphasis on regional cooperation. In March of 1995 
the Philippines discovered China had occupied Mischief Reef in 1994 and built structures 
with a radar antenna and a small pier.140 The discovery resulted in a ninety-minute battle 
between a Philippine naval gun boat and three Chinese naval vessels that marked the first 
military confrontation with Southeast Asian state besides Vietnam.141 Tensions subsided 
after Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen attended the ASEAN Region Forum in 1995 
and promised that China would settle maritime territorial disputes according to 
international law and the recently enacted UNCLOS agreement.142 
                                                 
139 Garver, “China’s Push through the South China Sea,” 1016. 
140 Ibid., 1013. 
141 Council on Foreign Relations, “China’s Maritime Disputes.” 
142 Fravel, “Maritime Security,” 36. 
 41 
The militarized conflicts between China and Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) member states Vietnam and the Philippines also led to the 
development of Code of Conduct (COC) for the SCS. After the Mischief Reef incident, 
ASEAN foreign ministers expressed “serious concern” and advised disputants “to refrain 
from taking actions that de-stabilize” the SCS.143 The Philippines began lobbying for a 
COC to constrain China from further encroachment, but a five-year delay in drafting an 
ASEAN COC, a Chinese submitted COC, and their disagreements on the geographic 
scope, restrictions on construction projects on both occupied and unoccupied features, 
military restrictions surrounding the Spratly Islands, and procedures surrounding the 
detainment of fishermen in disputed waters led to the 2002 non-binding Declaration on 
Conduct of Parties in the SCS (DOC).144 
2. Demilitarization from 2006–2013 
After the demilitarization following the Mischief Reef Incident, diplomatic 
disputes have been the major source of conflict in the SCS.145 Disputants have exercised 
territorial claims in contested waters through commercial fishing, hydrocarbon 
exploration, and other domestic legal means.146 As Vietnam increased hydrocarbon 
exploration in 2006 and 2007, China issued 18 diplomatic objections with foreign oil 
companies who were planning to explore offshore oil and natural gas resources in 
disputed waters.147 Fravel argued that fishermen operating in traditional fishing grounds, 
which occur in overlapping territorial claims, have also played an important role in 
exercising territorial claims.148 China maintains multiple agencies to contest and assert 
fishing and hydrocarbon claims—Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC), 
SSRFAB, MSF, and China Coast Guard amongst others. 
                                                 
143 Carlyle A. Thayer, “ASEAN, China and the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea,” SAIS 
Review of International Affairs 33, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2013), 76–77, doi: 10.1353/sais.2013.0022. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Fravel, “Maritime Security,” 36. 
146 Ibid., 37. 
147 Ibid., 36. 
148 Ibid., 37. 
 42 
The South Sea Regional Fisheries Administration Bureau, a department of the 
Bureau of Fisheries Administration within the Ministry of Agriculture, was strengthened 
over the last decade to enforce domestic fishing laws and supervise fishing in contested 
waters.149 The SSRFAB escorts fishing vessels in disputed waters in order to protect 
fishing vessels and declare Chinese jurisdiction.150 Between 2005 and 2009, the 
SSRFAB increased the amount of time its vessels were at sea from 477 to 1,235 days.151 
While it is difficult to determine the quantity and severity of incidents between fishermen 
from disputant states, typically Vietnam, Fravel cited Vietnamese newspaper Than Thein 
News that reported between 2005 and 2010 China detained 63 fishing boats and 725 
fishermen.152 Vietnam also patrols contested waters, and Chinese People’s Daily Press 
newspaper Huanqiu Shibao reported 300 incidents since 1989 including three incidents in 
2009 where Vietnamese boats fired on Chinese fishing boats.153 
China’s Maritime Surveillance Force, part of the State Oceanographic 
Administration, provides a similar function as the SSRFAB. A mission of the MSF is to 
“safeguard maritime rights and interests,” which accomplished by patrols and expressions 
of sovereignty—such as the 2010 MSF vessel that dropped a Chinese sovereignty marker 
on James Shoal.154 The MSF was involved in three important incidents in 2011: the first, 
two MSF vessels “expelled” a Philippine seismic survey ship in the Reed Bank; the 
second, an MSF vessel cut the tow cable of PetroVietnam’s Binh Minh 2 that was 120 
nautical miles (NM) off of Vietnam’s central coast; finally, includes a contested incident 
including an SSRFAB vessel and a “fishing boat with a ‘specialized cable-slashing 
device’” that “became ensnarled” with the towed sonar equipment of Canadian Talisman 
Energy’s Viking II.155 These events represent the capacity of non-military law 
enforcement agencies to exercise Chinese jurisdiction in disputed waters, and the status 
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of the SSRFAB and MSF as non-military vessels have established a norm for 
intervention. 
The other means that states have used to exercise their rights to claims in the SCS 
take the form of domestic legal measures. In April 2007, Vietnam established a township 
and two villages in the Spratly Island Trong Sa district of Khanh Hoa Province to display 
Vietnamese administrative control.156 In February 2009, the Philippine legislature passed 
an archipelagic baseline law that legally defined their domestic claims to features in the 
Spratly Islands.157 In June 2012, the Vietnamese National Assembly passed the Maritime 
Law that created the domestic legal claim for features in the Paracel and Spratly 
Islands.158 Also in June, China elevated the Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and the 
Spratly Islands from a county-level administrative office to prefecture-level city named 
Sansha City that is a part of Hainan Province.159 Fravel noted the importance of these 
domestic legal measures as ways to demonstrate sovereignty, for example the upgrade of 
Sansha created the institutional infrastructure to display increased sovereignty through 
tourism and fishing.160 
3. Interactions with U.S. Military 
China has also used the SSRFAB and MSF to exercise its view that the U.S. and 
other states should not conduct maritime surveillance in its EEZ. After two publicized 
examples of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) interactions with U.S. reconnaissance 
platforms in 2001—the USNS Bowditch was threatened by a PLAN Jianheu III-class 
frigate and a PLA Air Force F-8 fighter collided with a U.S. Navy EP-3, both in the 
South China Sea—it appears the SSRFAB and MSF vessels took over the role of 
signaling when Beijing desires to object to U.S. military surveillance in its EEZ.161 
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Interactions featuring U.S. military vessels and SSRFAB, MSF, or PLAN vessels 
exercising China’s views on maritime surveillance appear consistent throughout the 
demilitarized period. 
Recent examples from the USNS Impeccable and USS Cowpens illustrate the 
trend over time. In 2009, the USNS Impeccable was involved in an incident were one 
PLAN intelligence ship, an MSF vessel, a Fisheries Law Enforcement Command—part 
of the SSRFAB, and two commercial cargo ships surround the USNS Impeccable. 
Reports from the USNS Impeccable indicate that the civilian ships attempted to cut the 
towed array sonar cable. After their attempts were unsuccessful, they maneuvered at 
close distance eventually stopping in front of the USNS Impeccable causing her to take 
emergency action to avoid collision.162 In 2013, China reiterated its desire for the U.S. to 
stop conducting surveillance in its EEZ when a PLAN ship made radio contact and 
requested the USS Cowpens, which was observing the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning, 
leave the area.163 After the USS Cowpens asserted its right to operate in international 
waters, a PLAN amphibious ship dangerously maneuvered in front of the USS Cowpens 
forcing it to take emergency actions to avoid collision.164 
C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF UNCLOS 
The 1982 UNCLOS agreement, which came into force November 16, 1994, was 
ratified by China on June 7, 1996.165 Within the framework of UNCLOS, China excluded 
Article 2 of the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, as well as listing the 
Paracel and Spratly Islands as its territorial sea.166 Additionally, in 2006 the Chinese 
government filed a statement with UNCLOS reiterating its exemption of the dispute 
resolution section noting China, “does not accept any of the procedures provided for in 
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Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention with respect to all the categories of disputes 
referred to in paragraph 1 (a), (b), and (c) of Article 298 of the Convention.”167 The 
procedures refer to binding decisions from the International Tribunal on the Law of the 
Sea, the International Court of Justice, an arbitral tribunal, or a special arbitral tribunal—
either of which may apply to the UN Permanent Court of Arbitration.168 Despite having a 
ten year notice, Fravel argued the May 2009 deadline for submission of maritime baseline 
and EEZ claims to the CLCS forced disputants to make their claims legally explicit 
which increased territorial tensions in the region.169 
On 6 May 2009, Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam presented a joint 
submission to the UN CLCS, pursuant to Article 76 paragraph 8 of the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea 1982, for the 200 nautical mile delineation of the outer limits of 
their respective continental shelves.170 In response, the Chinese Government presented 
the UN Secretary General with two Notes Verbales and requested that they be presented 
to all UN Member States.171 The Notes Verbales reflected the region’s historic instability 
and numerous overlapping claims, challenged the joint submission, and stated: “China 
has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the SCS and the adjacent waters, and 
enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and 
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subsoil thereof.”172 This phrase was has been continually repeated by Chinese officials 
since 2009.173 
China’s second note verbale in 2011 was submitted in response to a note verbale 
presented to the UNCLOS in April of 2011 objecting to China’s 2009 note verbale and 
the nine-dashed line.174 Swaine and Fravel cited an international law expert who 
explained the implications of the 2011 note verbale as, China “stated—for the first 
time—that the islands are entitled to a territorial sea, EEZ, and continental shelf.”175 
Coupling this with the inclusion of the ‘seabed and subsoil thereof,’ this language is 
consistent with the China’s domestic EEZ law from 1998, and provides the most 
comprehensive interpretation of their claim to date; however, Chinese officials have not 
explicitly expressed or clarified their claim, which has led to ambiguity. 
While the PRC has maintained consistent claims since Zhou Enlai’s 1951 
declaration, the nine-dashed line map was first produced as legal evidence to the 
international community attached to the 2009 Notes Verbales.176 In 2011, the PRC 
requested another Note Verbale be presented to UN Member States which reiterated their 
claims and added: “China’s sovereignty and related rights and jurisdiction in the South 
China Sea are supported by abundant historical and legal evidence.”177 The 2009 and 
2011 declarations and reference map create a significant territorial and sovereignty 
problem for the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and Taiwan. Figure 3 
depicts the map as presented by the PRC in the 2009 Notes Verbales. 
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Figure 4.  Map of the South China Sea Islands (2009)178 
The Chinese claims have remained consistent, but the nine-dashed line map 
provided in the Note Verbale does not feature corresponding geographic coordinates that 
specify the extent of the claim, identify which features have which characteristics, or 
explained exactly what “China’s sovereignty and related rights” means, and this has led 
to further ambiguity in the Chinese claim.179 Fravel cited Greg Austin of the EastWest 
Institute, who noted the use of dashes suggested an “indefinite or uncertain boundary,” 
which would be consistent with the earlier removal of the dashes in the Gulf of 
Tonkin.180 Additionally, the domestic Chinese EEZ Law does not delineate the 
geographic boundary of the nine-dashed line as Article 14 states the EEZ “shall not affect 
the historic rights that the PRC enjoys.”181 The 2009 UNCLOS CLCS deadline created 
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what Fravel and Swaine called “a moment for states to issue claims, counter-claims, and 
counter counter-claims.”182 In that respect, UNCLOS has not helped to resolve any of the 
disputes in the SCS, but it did create a platform for each of the claimants to present their 
positions. 
D. LEADING CHINESE DECISION MAKERS FOR MARITIME POLICY 
After a series of consolidations, the most important figure of maritime policy 
making in the Communist Party of China is Xi Jinping. Xi’s roles as general secretary of 
the CPC, president of the PRC, chairman of the Central Military Commission, chairman 
of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) of the CPC Central Committee, and chairman 
of the recently created State Security Committee places him in the top position of power 
across the state, party, and military.183 Additionally, Xi is believed to head the National 
Security Leading Small Group (LSG), the Foreign Affairs LSG, and the new LSG for the 
Protection of Maritime Interests.184 Leadership of the LSG for the Protection of Maritime 
Interest gives Xi direct link to senior leaders who determine maritime policy—senior 
ministers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of Public Security 
(MPS), the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), and 
the PLA Navy are the principle ministries believed to be included.185  
Other influential decision makers for maritime policy are former professor of 
international relations and Xi’s “behind-the-scenes” advisor Wang Huning, the head of 
the Central Committee Propaganda Department Liu Qibao who issues China’s public 
rhetoric and maritime policy, and the CPC Central Committee (CC) General Office head 
Li Zhanshu who controls the flow of information to senior leaders. Each of these men is a 
Politburo member and personally linked to Xi; however, they do not hold positions 
representing the state and they do not interact with foreigners so their views are 
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unknown. The provincial Party secretaries in the coastal provinces of Guangdong and 
Hainan maintain influential leaders who are also Politburo and Central Committee 
members.186  
Within the MFA, the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs (DBOA) was 
created in 2009 with the purpose of developing policies for maritime boundaries, handle 
international relations concerning territories, maps, and place names, as well as 
participate in diplomatic negotiations on maritime delineations. Jakobson reported that 
despite experience dealing with international relations, interviews with MFA bureaucrats 
indicated it was “a weak department within a weak ministry,” with its decisions routinely 
overridden.187 Further complicating the MFA, as Politburo members the six provincial 
Party leaders all outrank Yang Jiechi, the state councilor for foreign affairs who is only a 
Central Committee Member, they retain direct links to the top leadership and are in a 
powerful position to affect SCS maritime policy.188 
Prior to 2013 China maintained five civilian maritime law enforcement agencies: 
China Maritime Police, China Maritime Surveillance (CMS), Fisheries Law Enforcement 
Command, Maritime Anti-Smuggling Bureau, and Maritime Safety Administration 
(MSA), but a recent consolidation brought all of these agencies under the newly 
established State Oceanic Commission. Jakobson noted that many analysts expect the 
commission to oversee the drafting of a national maritime strategy and basic law of the 
ocean for the SCS. All of China’s maritime law enforcement agencies were restructured 
into one fleet that will be called the “China Coast Guard.”189 Jakobson does note the role 
of the PLAN in China’s maritime policy is unknown, but the consolidation of agencies 
does make interactions easier to accomplish. 
As the Politburo and CPC maintain their traditional commitment to secretiveness, 
both Western and Chinese scholars are unable to study Chinese elite decision making. 
Despite a lack of access, it is evident that Xi has accomplished two major initiatives: 
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consolidating power across the maritime domain and putting in place the policies to 
become a maritime power. In mid-2012 while he was leader-in-waiting, Xi’s first new 
appointment was as head of the newly created LSG for the Protection of Maritime 
Interests, and the trend of consolidating power over the maritime institutions was 
continued by placing each of the agencies dealing with the exercise of maritime 
sovereignty or jurisdiction under his direct control—MFA and DBOA, SOA with the 
China Coast Guard and MSF, MOA with the SSRFAB, and the PLAN. One of 
Jakobson’s senior interviewees indicated this collusion of agencies has even included the 
powerful coastal provinces. The interviewee, a CPC representative from Hainan, reported 
meeting monthly with senior law enforcement officials, and occasionally senior PLAN 
officers participate in these planning meetings. The interviewee also expressed informal 
discussions with oil company representatives, provincial officials, maritime scholars, and 
media representatives.190 
Xi’s second initiative, creating the policies to become a maritime power, is 
evident from the recent history of Chinese five-year plans—the CPC plans that set the 
guidelines for development or reform. The eleventh Chinese five-year plan from 2006–
2010 included just one section on the maritime, but that increased in the twelfth five-year 
plan to include an entire new chapter on the marine economy.191 Chinese defense white 
papers from 2002–2010 only mentioned the marine domain in reference to a subsections, 
a chapter in 2006 on building border and costal defense mentions the joint patrols in the 
Gulf of Tonkin with Vietnam, a chapter in 2008 focused on naval modernization and 
force building, and a chapter in 2010 on military confidence building has a subsection on 
dialogues and cooperation on maritime security.192 China’s 2012 defense white paper, 
“The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” elevated the role of the 
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maritime, it received equal weight as the air and land domains, and included a specific 
subsection on safeguarding maritime rights and interests.193 Xi’s policy decisions 
demonstrate an increased level of elite interest in the SCS, and they are the foundation for 
directing Chinese behavior that is illustrative of a favorable reference point. 
E. AN EXAMINATION OF RESOLVED TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 
M. Taylor Fravel’s seminal investigation into Chinese territorial disputes, Strong 
Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflicts in China’s Territorial Disputes, 
examined Chinese behavior presenting three strategies leaders can employ to reach their 
territorial goals: first, states can delay; second, states can cooperate, but cooperation can 
be costly because of the domestic price of territorial concessions; finally, states can 
escalate the dispute, although escalation can also carry a heavy price in the form of 
human and material costs, the political ramifications of defeat, and the uncertainty of 
conflict.194 Fravel’s thematic conclusions are that China has not been prone to using 
force, domestic political instability creates a strong incentive for concessions on 
international disputes, and “a decline in bargaining power” was a strong motivator to use 
force in territorial disputes.195 
Fravel found that as China increased its economic and military power over the last 
twenty years, it has been more likely to compromise than escalate disputes. The largest 
driver of concession appears to be domestic unrest, and Fravel argued that the revolts in 
Tibet caused China to provide concessions to Burma, Nepal, and India in 1960 to settle 
border disputes. Additionally, he points to unrest in Xinjiang in the early 1990s as the 
cause for similar concessions settling disputes with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan. In both cases of nationalist unrest, China traded concessions in settling border 
disputes for assistance in suppressing its domestic opponent abroad.196 
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Fravel points to the escalation of the Taiwanese straits crisis in 1955, 1958, and 
1995 as evidence that declining bargaining power will create the incentive for escalation 
even in homeland disputes. In the 1950s, an increase in U.S. military support for Taiwan 
threatened permanent separation, and Fravel argued the escalation to militarization of the 
first two Taiwanese Straits crisis was a response from China’s weakened position. When 
the U.S. supported 1990s democracy movement in Taiwan threatened permanent 
separation again, the 1995 crisis escalation was a signal of commitment despite a 
weakened position.197 
In the SCS, China has only resolved one territorial dispute and Fravel argued 
China has generally taken a position of delay, has “never entered into talks with any of its 
adversaries concerning the sovereignty of these areas,” and, when pressed, it has 
escalated crises to strengthen their position.198 Fravel believed the consistency of China’s 
claim was “noteworthy,” and he argued that because Taiwan has claimed sovereignty 
over the SCS it is a nationalist issue meaning concessions would weaken its claim as the 
legitimate government of “one China.”199 Fravel even argued that China’s one instance 
of resolving a dispute in the SCS was an anomaly, as Mao’s decision in 1957 to transfer 
control of White Dragon Tail Island in the Tonkin Gulf was made in the context of 
supporting North Vietnam against the US. According to Fravel’s account of Chinese 
scholars, Mao was ideologically motivated by socialism to help an ally well before 
leaders recognized the economic value of maritime territory and their resources in an 
EEZ. As the increased importance of the islands became clear in the 1970s, Fravel argued 
that China’s claims became weaker, and the resulting conflicts in 1974 and 1988 were 
escalations intended to strengthen the Chinese position. In the context of Fravel’s 
argument, the demilitarization in the disputed islands is the result of China’s rise, the 
increased ability of the PLAN to exercise China claims, and the increased strength of 
China’s claims. Fravel presented China’s decision not to react to Vietnam and Malaysia’s 
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occupation of additional features in the Spratly Islands in 1998 and 1999 as evidence of 
China’s perceived position of power.200 
Fravel’s examination of Chinese territorial disputes and resolutions indicates two 
things for the SCS: first, based on the consistency and nationalist nature of China’s claim 
it is like China would be unwilling actually settle or reduce its claim; and second, a 
weakening of the strength of its claims would be a catalyst for escalation and conflict. 
These two features from Fravel’s work mean that the status of China’s claims and the 
international institutions that could affect or mediate the disputes should take an 
increased importance in Chinese foreign policy. In the case of a significant domestic 
crisis, the White Dragon Tail concession to Vietnam does provide an historic president 
that Chinese leaders could use to justify island concessions for assistance in ending the 
crisis like was the case in 1960 and the early 1990s. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The history of militarized and demilitarized conflict in the SCS significantly 
complicates the current status of disputes in the SCS. As the conflicts demilitarized, 
civilian agencies representing fishing and hydrocarbon exploration became the new 
representation of sovereignty. During the period of demilitarization, 2006 marked a shift 
in Chinese behavior leading up to the 2009 UNCLOS CLCS declaration of territorial 
claims by SCS disputants. The continuality of Sino-U.S. surveillance related incidents is 
a useful tool to illustrate that there is a separation between Chinese behavior with respect 
to its territorial disputes and maritime surveillance in its claimed EEZ. Fravel’s analysis 
of Chinese conflict resolution also provides a tool for understanding variations in Chinese 
behavior regarding territorial disputes, and provides a historical basis for Chinese risk 
acceptance during periods of declining relative strength. This thesis will use this 
framework to examine if the balance-of-risk hypotheses can explain the deviation in 
Chinese behavior. The next chapter will provide specific evidence in an attempt to prove 
each applied hypothesis. 
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A. EVALUATING CHINA’S ACTIONS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
In order to evaluate whether Chinese actions in the SCS are consistent with the 
Balance-of-risk Theory described in Chapter III, this thesis will present evidence 
supporting or refuting each of the four hypotheses and the null hypothesis. The analysis 
of Chinese behavior focuses on events which occurred from 2006 leading up to the 2009 
declaration of Chinese territorial claims to the international audience within UNCLOS 
CLCS. 
B. APPLIED HYPOTHESIS ONE 
AP-1: Chinese leaders have anticipated a decrease in relative status in the 
SCS, and they should frame a favorable reference point. Chinese leaders 
should illustrate a national interest in increasing relative and hard power. 
In the context of the International Court of Justice’s hearings and territorial 
sovereignty decision over the maritime dispute between Singapore and Malaysia, this 
thesis argues that the 2009 deadline for submissions to the UNCLOS CLCS threatened to 
decrease the relative status of China in the SCS, and the perceived systemic pressures 
caused Chinese leaders to choose a favorable reference point illustrated by the nine-
dashed line map. This section will begin by defining the shift in geopolitical context that 
began in 2006, and it will present evidence of an adjustment to Chinese elite perception 
reflected in changes to foreign policy, increases in the power and capabilities of maritime 
institutions, and updates of hard power, military doctrine, strategy, and tactics that are 
aligned with framing a favorable reference point of the territory inside of the nine-dashed 
line map. 
The context of the SCS disputes prior to 2006 was a period of reduced tensions 
and demilitarization. The Mischief Reef incident in 1995 was the last time China 
physically took a disputed island by force, and China’s restraint from challenging the 
occupation of additional features by Vietnam and Malaysia in 1998 and 1999 is 
consistent with Fravel’s argument that as China’s relative and hard power increased its 
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need to use force to maintain its position declined.201 The 2002 DOC also demonstrated 
that China had increased confidence in its ability to control the outcomes of territorial 
disputes in the SCS.202 The international context of island disputes began to change in 
2002 after the precedent set by the International Court of Justice regarding sovereignty of 
Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan between Indonesia and Malaysia offered establishment 
of a dispute resolution mechanism.203 In 2006 Singapore and Malaysia continued the 
trend of settling island disputes through the ICJ by submitting documentary evidence in 
the dispute over Pedra Branca and Middle Rocks Reef—two features in the Singapore 
Straits.204 This dispute was notable because it mirrors many of those in the SCS, 
Singapore maintained control of Pedra Branca with little incentive and a greater risk to 
arbitrate, the records were based on colonial era documents, local fishermen working in 
tradition waters inflamed the dispute, and neither side could find resolve the dispute 
through bi-lateral negotiations. In 2008 the ICJ issued a judgement awarding Pedra 
Branca to Singapore and the Middle Rocks Reef to Malaysia based on the 1953 letter 
from Acting State Secretary of Johor to the British colonial government stating they did 
not claim ownership of Pedra Branca.205 The ICJ’s ruling continued the precedent for 
future arbitration of disputed maritime territories. In 2009, the UNCLOS CLCS 
continued to change the international context by requiring states to clarify their claims to 
territorial waters, continental shelves, and EEZs which formalized disputes in an 
international institution. Malaysia and Vietnam took advantage of this international 
platform to formally declare their disputes, and the Philippines took it one step farther in 
January of 2013 by notifying the Chinese ambassador they would be seeking arbitration 
of their dispute under UNCLOS CLCS.206 Regardless of the strength of their case or the 
ability to compel China to participate in arbitration, the Philippine case is a perceived 
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threat to the China’s territoriality in the SCS that could result in the future arbitration for 
all of China’s formalized maritime disputes. This is a significant challenge to the China’s 
confidence in its ability to control the resolution of its maritime disputes. 
After observing the changes in their geopolitical position beginning in 2006, the 
CPC adjusted its foreign policy. At the 2009 Party’s Central Work Conference on 
Foreign Affairs in 2009, President Hu revised the Deng Xiaoping’s famous ‘24 character’ 
guide to China’s foreign policy which has acted as its guide since the early 1990s.207 The 
change to Chinese foreign policy was confirmed in a December 2012 Jiefangjun Bao 
(official paper of the People’s Liberation Army) article summarizing a speech by General 
Ma Xiaotian, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, given to the China Institute 
for International Strategic Studies (PLA think tank based in Beijing).208 Fravel argued 
that the official pronouncement of the reformulated policy, as noted earlier the new 
policy is stated as: “uphold (jianchi) keeping a low profile and actively (jiji) achieve 
something,” by a military officer confirmed the policy change, illustrated the growing 
role of the military in foreign policy, proved a consensus between the PLA and CPC on 
foreign policy.209 While Yahuda and others point to the economic downturn of the US, 
European Union, and West in the global recession and the growing importance of the 
Brazil, South Africa, India, and China (BASIC) were threatening to replace the G-8 with 
the G-20 was a possible explanation of the change in foreign policy; this thesis 
acknowledges the impact of the global financial crisis, but argues that the foreign policy 
change is a result of the pressures placed on China’s position in the SCS and is supported 
by rhetoric expressing a favorable reference point, the strengthening of China’s maritime 
institutions, and the changing of maritime strategy and tactics.210 Although this evidence 
may appear tautological, Chinese behavior was directed by proactive policy decisions in 
place before the global financial crisis affected the Chinese position in the international 
system. 
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Chinese leaders have expressed rhetoric that has increased the importance of the 
disputed territory in the SCS. Former state councilor Dai Bingguo, the senior PRC 
official responsible for foreign policy, defined China’s “core interests” in July 2009 as 
including three components: “preserving China’s basic state system and national 
security,” “national sovereignty and territorial integrity,” and “the continued stable 
development of China’s economy and society.”211 After Dai’s defining remarks, Chinese 
officials referred to “sovereignty and territorial integrity” as China’s most important 
“core interest.”212 Chinese officials have also repeatedly called core interests non-
negotiable, and phrases like ““never waver, compromise, or yield” or “must stand firm, 
be clear-cut, have courage to fight, and never trade away principles” have been used to 
highlight the significance the PRC places on these issues. The PRC has labeled territorial 
issues Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet as core interests, and these represent the 
most important foreign policy issues to the PRC.213 In March 2010, the New York Times 
reported that Obama Administration senior officials Jeffrey A. Bader and James B. 
Steinberg were told by PRC officials that “that China would not tolerate any interference 
in the SCS, now part of China’s ‘core interest’ of sovereignty.”214 Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton repeated the inclusion of the SCS as a core interest at an Australian press 
interview, and the Associated Press reported that Dai had officially expressed this 
opinion to Clinton during a strategic and economic dialogue in Beijing.215 Subsequently, 
it appears as though the position has not been substantiated by any PRC official, official 
PRC press releases, or formal PRC documents. Official visits between Chinese Defense 
Minister Liang Guanglie and U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Hanoi in 2010, and 
President Hu Jintao and President Barack Obama, Washington 2011, did not clarify the 
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status of SCS as a core interest.216 While accounts vary of the use of the term ‘core 
interest,’ Chinese rhetoric appears to signal that the SCS has assumed the status of a 
national interest at the very least slightly below the level reserved for Taiwan, Xinjiang, 
or Tibet. 
After assuming control of the CPC and state, Xi continued a rhetorical position 
consistent with the SCS as a de facto core interest. Xi rallied national sentiment at the 
18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China by bringing back the “Great 
Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” platform of former CPC leader Jiang Zemin in the 
form of his new “Chinese Dream.”217 Within the ‘Chinese Dream,’ Xi maintained 
adherence to peaceful development, but “In no way will the country abandon its 
legitimate rights and interests, nor will it give up its core national interests.”218 Bonnie 
Glaser of the Center for Strategic and International Studies presented the argument: 
“Strengthening China’s control over the SCS is part of his (Xi’s) ‘China Dream’ of 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” based on clear signaling from phrases such as 
“protection of maritime rights and interests,” “resolutely safeguarding territorial 
sovereignty,” and China should not “relinquish our legitimate rights and interests or 
sacrifice China’s ‘core interests’” presented at the Central Conference on Work Relating 
to Foreign Affairs in 2014.219 
In Xi’s ‘Chinese Dream’ the military will play a central role in maintaining 
control of the SCS. Meng Xiangqing, deputy director for Strategic Studies at the National 
Defense University, stated in China Daily that the centerpiece of the ‘Chinese Dream’ is 
“rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and a nation cannot be rejuvenated without a strong 
military,” a statement which is backed up by a picture published in China Daily showing 
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seamen spelling out “Chinese Dream, Military Dream” on the newly commissioned 
aircraft carrier Liaoning.220 These are examples of the centrality of the PLAN to Xi’s 
dream, and Xi further clarified the need for the Chinese military to be able to accomplish 
maritime operations in a three part slogan to the PLA at the 12th National People’s 
Congress that said: “strengthening the military under the new situation” required 
“building a military force of the people that obeys the party’s command, is able to fight 
victorious battles, and has a good style.”221 Xi’s new motto was followed by the 
guidance: “resolutely defend the state’s sovereignty, security, and develop interests; 
firmly protect the security of the people’s lives and property; and struggle for realizing 
the dreams of building a strong nation and a strong army.”222 Xi’s guidance to the 
military is a clear indication of the importance territoriality to protecting Chinese 
fisheries and hydrocarbon resources, and the break from the traditional long-term defense 
mobilization and defense emphasizing “full military readiness” is particularly relevant to 
the disputes in the SCS.223 
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Figure 5.  Chinese seamen in formation of Chinese characters reading: 
“Chinese Dream, Military Dream” aboard the carrier Liaoning224 
Along with the rhetorical move towards defending sovereignty and protecting 
rights, the 2009 UNCLOS CLCS deadline forced China to declare its claims and set a 
reference point. China has expressed its claims to the UN in three Notes Verbales, two in 
2009 and one in 2011, with the first Note Verble from 2009 outlined China’s basic 
position: 
China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the SCS and the 
adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the 
relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof (see attached 
map). The above position is consistently held by the Chinese government, 
and is widely known by the international community.225 
The ‘attached map’ is a reference to the nine-dashed line map from. The second 
Note Verbale included maps and information that dealt with the East China Sea, but 
furthered China’s position asserting the “right to make submissions on the outer limits of 
the continental shelf that extends beyond 200 nautical miles in the East China Sea and in 
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other sea areas.”226 The ‘other areas’ is typically interpreted as referring to the SCS.227 
The third Note Verbale, presented to the UN in April of 2011, repeated the 2009 Note 
Verbale; however, it included the phrases: “China’s sovereignty and related rights and 
jurisdiction in the SCS are supported by abundant historical and legal evidence” and the 
explicit “China (sic) enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as 
well as the seabed and subsoil.”228 This declaration has been interpreted by experts as 
China, for the first time, that “that the islands are entitled to a territorial sea, EEZ and 
continental shelf.”229 Together these statements present the Chinese claim, and combined 
with rhetoric from Chinese leaders represents a favorable reference point because China 
does not occupy and control all of the islands and features in the SCS. 
The first piece of evidence that displays the elite shift in interest to align with a 
reference point including all the territory within the nine-dashed line map is the increased 
importance of maritime institutions. The first evidence of increased institutional 
importance was the created of the DBOA in 2009, which was followed by the inclusion 
of an entire chapter on the maritime in the twelfth five-year plan 2011–2015.230 
Additionally, then leader-in-waiting, Xi’s first senior level position was as head of a 
newly created LSG for the Protection of Maritime Interests. While LSGs are not 
formalized bureaucratic institutions with operating procedures or regulatory power, Alice 
Miller argued that they maintain “serious bureaucratic power,” and “serve the policy 
making process in two ways—policy formulation and implementation.”231 Miller noted 
that under Xi displaced the LSG on CC Politics and Law Committee, which was directed 
by Luo Fan and then by Zhou Yongkang under the Hu administration, with another LSG 
directed by Xi, the State Security Commission. These institutional maneuvers effectively 
organized power and gives Xi direct access to all of the organizations involved in setting 
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and executing China’s maritime policy. So far the results from this consolidation of 
power include the 2013 creation of the State Oceanic Commission that some analysts 
view as the body which will oversee the drafting of China’s national maritime strategy 
and oceanic laws, the consolidation of China’s civilian maritime agencies into the China 
Coast Guard, and Jakobson’s unconfirmed account that the decision by Yang Jiechi to 
pass the HSD-981 plan to the maritime LSG for approval was the only reason the mission 
occurred—Jakobson noted senior interviewees indicated that Hainan provincial officials 
had lobbied aides under Hu for years without gaining approval for the oil rig mission.232 
The institution changes represent an increased capacity for the CPC to respond to 
maritime challenges at the highest level with coordinated responses, and China has 
greatly increased the hard power of its civilian maritime agencies and supplemented their 
activities with PLAN planning and support. Beginning in 2009, Jacobson cited Xinhuanet 
reporting that dozens of ocean-going patrol ships, sourced from domestic construction or 
PLAN decommissioning, were transferred to the civilian maritime agencies.233 These 
vessels are significantly larger in tonnage and number than their new counterparts in the 
coast guard, and Jacobson cited the State Council Information Office who reported that 
an additional 20 maritime police vessels began construction in 2014 that are expected to 
have a greater tonnage than the combined tonnage of U.S. and Japanese Coast Guards.234 
As mentioned earlier as an indicator of newly assertive behavior for Fravel, the PLAN 
has been supplementing the efforts of civilian maritime agencies dealing with foreign 
civilian maritime and fishing interests. An early examples of this kind of assertive 
behavior is the widely publicized 2011 joint PLAN, CMS, and FLEC joint exercise were 
the PLAN backed up CMS and FLEC vessels deployed to protect fishing vessels being 
harassed by another state.235 During the HD-981 mission, Vietnamese media reported 
that multiple PLAN ships including two Type 071 LPDs and one Type 053H3 frigate 
were part of the flotilla, which accompanied HD-981, and this claim was bolstered by the 
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Chinese state media reporting on June 10, 2014, that a Fuchi-class replenishment ship 
was on patrol in the area near HD-981.236 Jacobson’s interviewees confirmed the 
presence PLAN officers, and they “praised the professionalism of the PLAN officers.237 
After the HD-981 mission, the PLAN organized a drill in waters off of Vietnam that 
simulated a scenario were ten units from the PLAN, PLAN Air Force, PLA Air Force, 
China Coast Guard, and FLEC defended an oil rig from foreign fishing vessels.238 These 
exercises have featured combat support ships, destroyers, naval helicopters, submarines, 
and aircraft supporting civilian law enforcement agencies. In June 2014, the PLA Daily 
reported that the PLAN is “actively building a military-police-civilian joint defense 
mechanism” and “closely coordinating with maritime forces to implement joint rights 
protection.”239 
Another increase in hard power was the commissioning of the Liaoning an ex-
Ukranian aircraft carrier and the development of an indigenous aircraft carrier program; 
but because the Liaoning and future carriers are in their infancy, an examination of 
military strategy, tactics, and their specific resources provides better evidence of the 
desires of Chinese elites.240 White papers on national defense, which are written for the 
Ministry of National Defense by the PLA Academy of Military Science (AMS), illustrate 
the growing significance of the maritime domain after 2006.241 The 2006 white paper 
mentioned joint patrols with Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin, the 2008 white paper 
focused on naval modernization, the 2010 white paper included a subsection on dialogue 
and cooperation in maritime security, and the 2012 white paper elevated the issue by 
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including an entire subsection to safeguarding maritime rights and interests.242 Further 
exploring sources of military strategy, Christopher Twomey and Fravel presented an 
argument that the AMS strategic guide for 2013, The Science of Military Strategy, that 
outlined four kinds of wars China may be faced with: “1) a large-scale, high-intensity 
defensive war on the Chinese mainland (low probability and high risk); 2) a relatively 
large-scale and relatively high-intensity ‘anti-secessionist war’ over Taiwan (relatively 
high probability and high risk); 3) medium-and small-scale wars over disputed territories 
and waters (medium probability and risk); and 4) small-scale and low-intensity counter-
terror, stability maintenance, and rights defense actions (no probability or risk assigned to 
these actions).” This section of the book concluded that “the most likely threat of war is a 
limited military conflict in the maritime direction”243 Drilling down to the tactical level, 
the Twomey and Fravel cited a 2012 AMS textbook that included six types of campaigns 
that are typical of PLA writings: “a firepower attack campaign, an island blockade 
campaign, an island assault campaign, an air defense campaign, a border defense 
campaign, and an anti-landing campaign.”244 While Twomey and Fravel noted these 
campaigns generally refer to Taiwan, the Indian border, or mainland defense, combining 
the tactical campaigns with the strategic guidance belief that conflict is most likely in the 
maritime—separate from a Taiwan scenario—it appears as though both strategic and 
tactical thinkers are increasingly preparing for a military option in island disputes. The 
naval modernization coincides with this evolving strategic thinking, and since 2006, 
China’s amphibious capability has increased with the domestic production of three 
Yuzhao (Type 071) amphibious ships with another under construction, the development 
of a 20,000 ton Type 081 amphibious ship program that provides significant upgrades for 
island campaign capabilities over the Type 071, and the delivery of four Ukrainian made 
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air-cushioned landing crafts (LCACs) with the payload capacity of 150 tons.245 In 2015, 
the PLA Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Division was increased from 30,000 to 60,000 
troops making up four divisions each consisting of 300 armored and amphibious transport 
vehicles that complement the 20,000 troop PLA Marine Corps.246 While the force size 
has grown larger, O’Rouke referred to a U.S. Department of Defense report that said the 
PLA could not invade Taiwan, and currently only has the sea lift capability to launch an 
invasion of a small-sized island like Taiwanese controlled Taiping Island (Itu Aba) in the 
Spratly Islands.247 
The geopolitical context of the ICJ arbitration ruling between Singapore and 
Malaysia created the conditions for the 2009 UNCLOS CLCS deadline to threaten the 
international legal status of China’s claims to the territory of the SCS encompassed by the 
nine-dashed line. China responded to this systemic pressure by adopting a reference point 
based on their historic claims to the SCS, and they have signaled this reference point by 
placing an increased emphasis on maritime territoriality. An investigation comparing 
Chinese behavior before and after 2006 shows a variation in behavior beginning at the 
top with the consolidation of power over the maritime by Xi, a reinterpretation of 
Chinese foreign policy, and changes to military doctrine. The variations are evident in 
lower echelons of the state by changes to military strategy and tactics, maritime law 
enforcement capabilities, and the integration of PLA forces into the sovereignty disputes. 
C. APPLIED HYPOTHESIS TWO 
China has maintained consistent claims since Zhou Enlai’s 1951 
declaration, so Chinese leaders should reject any renormalization—
readjustment to a new less desirable reference point—that provides a 
territoriality outcome outside of the anchored reference point. 
After maintaining claims based on Zhou Enlai’s declaration in 1951, Chinese 
leaders have anchored and rejected any renormalization that relinquishes territory in the 
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SCS. The 2009 UNCLOS CLCS deadline forced China to formalize their claims, and 
leaders anchored on the area encompassed by the nine-dashed line as an anchor. Prior to 
anchoring on this reference point, China displayed openness and willingness to 
negotiate—or at least continue Fravel’s strategy of delay. After anchoring, objections to 
arbitrations and the continued stalling on the COC treaty are examples of China’s 
rejection of renormalization to any potential that provides an outcome outside of its 
anchored reference point. 
While China has maintained a longstanding claim over the SCS, the demilitarized 
period following the Mischief Reef incident saw an increase in the strength of China’s 
position that led to cooperation when they maintained control over negotiations. The 
unopposed 1998 and 1999 seizures of features in the Spratly Islands by Malaysia and 
Vietnam and 2002 DOC agreement are examples of China’s perceived strong position in 
the SCS mentioned earlier in Chapter I. Another example is the 2000 Sino-Vietnamese 
Agreement on Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin.248 The Boundary 
Agreement, based on the 1982 UNCLOS, was ratified by both Vietnam and China and 
came into effect in 2004. The treaty has a history based on Chinese concessions, which 
includes the removal of the dashed lines from the ROC’s SCS map and Mao’s decision in 
1957 to transfer control of White Dragon Tail Island to North Vietnam mentioned earlier, 
but illustrates the strength of China’s position in 2000. Article 2 of the agreement sets 21 
geographic positions that delineate a maritime boundary; however, the agreement that 
China ratified does not include a straight baseline from which territorial seas, continental 
shelves, or EEZs can be determined, and they were able to negotiate a 46.77 percent 
share of delineation despite the presence of White Dragon Tail Island.249 White Dragon 
Tail Island is located in the middle of the Gulf of Tonkin, and under UNCLOS should 
have been granted a significantly larger representation than the 25 percent effect it was 
granted—this reduced White Dragon Tail Island to a 12 NM territorial sea and three NM 
EEZ. Despite not achieving its demand of equal division, the Chinese government 
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accepted the terms of the treaty as a “result of equality.”250 These events confirm 
Fravel’s earlier findings, and the negotiations reject the notion that there was an anchored 
reference point prior to the 2004 ratification of the Sino-Vietnamese Agreement on 
Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin. 
After 2009 China’s geopolitical position in the SCS was weakened by threats to 
its claims, and its behavior reflects maintaining an anchor around a preexisting reference 
point and refusing to participate in any negotiations that could limit their claims (and 
serve as a renormalization of that reference point). In 2013, the Philippines presented the 
UN a Note Verbale requesting international arbitration at the UN Permanent Court of 
Arbitration in order to resolve its maritime disputes with China.251 The request for 
dispute resolution was rejected by China, and the Chinese foreign ministry again 
expressed the Chinese view in a point paper: “China has indisputable sovereignty over 
the SCS Islands (the Dongsha Islands, the Xisha Islands, the Zhongsha Islands and the 
Nansha Islands) and the adjacent waters.”252 The Philippines proceeded and brought the 
case The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China to the UN 
Permanent Court of Arbitration and set a precedent for other states with SCS territorial 
disputes.253 China responded with a January 22, 2013 Note Verbale to the UN that 
contained a position paper which rejected the Philippine’s claim as a unilateral move 
despite the bilateral instruments between China and the Philippines specifically noting 
“the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS (“DOC”), signed by both China 
and the Philippines, explicitly states that territorial and jurisdictional disputes shall be 
resolved peacefully by sovereign States directly concerned through friendly consultations 
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and negotiations.”254 China’s basis for rejecting UN arbitration rests on the argument that 
UNCLOS does not apply to territorial sovereignty disputes—despite previously 
negotiating a maritime territorial delineation based on UNCLOS with Vietnam in the 
Gulf of Tonkin—and that Articles 280 and 281 from the DOC provide additional legal 
protection from UN arbitration because they call for “no recourse to arbitration or other 
compulsory procedures.”255 The rational for rejecting the Philippine desire for arbitration 
is a clear example of a change from China’s position in 2004 and its subsequent 
anchoring and refusal to renormalize. 
Other attempts at multilateral territorial dispute resolution, such as the 
implementation of the DOC or creation of a COC, have not been supported by China. 
While China signed the 2002 ASEAN led DOC for the SCS, its change in position made 
officials routinely stall negotiations of an actual COC that would accomplish the DOC’s 
objectives because they would create an arbitration mechanism and limit Chinese 
displays of sovereignty like military exercises and patrols in disputed waters.256 Chinese 
Foreign Minister Wang Yi voiced the opinion of China on the COC in August of 2013, 
and stated: 
First, reasonable expectations. Some countries are talking about “quick 
fix,” like reaching consensus on COC within one day. It is an attitude 
neither realistic nor serious. COC involves multilateral interests from 
different parties, and its formulation is a process of sophisticated and 
complex coordination. 
Second, consensus through negotiations. We should refer to the 
experience of reaching DOC to move forward COC. To seek consensus as 
broadly as possible and to keep the comfort of all parties in mind. Wills of 
individual country or of a few countries should not be imposed on other 
countries, as an old Chinese saying, nothing forcibly done is going to be 
agreeable. 
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Third, elimination of interference. China and ASEAN countries tried 
several times to discuss on COC before, but got stuck due to some 
interferences. All parties concerned should do more to help moving 
forward the process of COC, and create the necessary conditions and 
atmosphere, not going the opposite way. 
Fourth, step-by-step approach. The formulation of COC is stipulated in 
DOC. COC is not to replace DOC, much less to ignore DOC and go its 
own way. The top priority now is to continue to implement DOC, 
especially promoting maritime cooperation. In this process, we should 
formulate the road map for COC through consultations, and push it 
forward in a step-by-step approach.257 
Wang’s apparently moderate comments bring up some notable points that warrant 
rebuttal and contextualization. First, although there is not a ‘quick fix’ solution, 
negotiations on the COC began when the Philippines lobbied for a COC after the 
Mischief Reef incident in 1995. ASEAN formed a consensus in 1999, and negotiations 
between ASEAN and China have been ongoing from that point. Second, China’s 
reference to the ‘elimination of interference,’ is expressing their desire for the United 
States, and its lobbying of ASEAN states, to pursue an agenda based on completing a 
COC, to remain out of the consensus.258 Finally, Wang acknowledged that the DOC has 
been ignored by all disputants. Carlyle Thayer points to these comments, and argued that 
China is likely to test ASEAN and may, “manufacture a pretext at any moment to 
suspend discussions due to what it considers to be the unacceptable behavior of one of 
the claimants.” For Thayer, a formalized COC agreement with institutionalized dispute 
resolution mechanisms is unlikely because negotiations are “likely to be protracted if not 
interminable.” Despite the recent agreement to move forward with COC negotiations, 
Wang’s comments point towards a strategy of continued stalling that is illustrative of 
China’s reluctance towards anything that could force the renormalization of its anchor 
point.259 
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The evidence presented in this section shows there was a period where China was 
comfortable enough with its position in the SCS that it would overlook the occupation of 
its claims by other disputants and even negotiate maritime boundaries, but that position 
was supplanted in 2009 and China reacted by anchoring on its long term claim—the nine-
dashed line. After 2009, there is little evidence to suggest that China will formally 
participate in dispute resolution mechanisms that would force renormalization, and it is 
apparent that China will reject any multilateral or bilateral agreements that limit its 
territoriality or ability to exercise military power in the SCS. 
D. APPLIED HYPOTHESIS THREE 
In the anticipation of losses, Chinese leaders should intervene against 
challenges in the SCS, and those interventions should include behaviors 
that are risk acceptant and outside of the standards of behavior and inter-
state interaction set forth in international agreements. 
In reaction to perceived challenges from the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia 
over their disputes in the SCS, China began series of escalation of disputes to signal their 
power in the SCS. This section will look at fishing and hydrocarbon related incidents that 
are deviations from behavior observed prior to the 2006, the in the geopolitical position 
of China, and meet the threshold for risk acceptant behavior—new and unilateral 
behavior or words that are sanctioned by the government, that are confrontational, 
destabilizing, or threatening, and whose goal is to change the status quo. This section will 
list a sequence of behavior, highlight the reasons they are risk acceptant behavior, and 
compare them against the standards of inter-state interaction set forth in the DOC.  
This section will test risk acceptant behavior against the 2002 DOC because each 
of the disputant states agreed to the DOC, and this agreement reaffirmed commitment to 
other guiding international treaties—the Charter of the UN, the 1982 UNCLOS, the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence—which seek to provide rules, norms, and standards for state to state 
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interactions.260 Article Five specifically presents a measure from which risk acceptant 
behavior can be measured: 
The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities 
that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability 
including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the 
presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to 
handle their differences in a constructive manner.261 
Actions that violate the spirit of Article Five will be viewed as violating 
international norms for state to state interactions. 
China’s risk acceptant behavior highlighted by fishing related actions: 
2005 – Truong Ngoc Nhi, vice chairman of the Quang Ngai People’s 
Committee, said that 63 fishing boat and 725 fishermen were detained 
between 2005 and 2010.262 This trend appears to have begun again with 
the possibility of militarization in the wake of the HD-981 deployment.263 
In every case Vietnam argued their fishermen were in sovereign waters, 
while China contends that they were in Chinese waters. 
2009 – China expanded the duration of its unilateral fishing ban, which 
had been in place since 1999, from half of month to three months. The 
MOA claimed the prevention was to protect fishery resources, but the ban 
coincided with increases in SSRFAB enforcement.264 
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2012 and 2013 – PLAN, the CMS, and FLEC conduct publicized joint 
exercises defending Chinese fishing vessels from harassment.265  
2012 – China and the Philippines were involved in a four-week standoff 
over fishing at the Scarborough Shoal/Huangyan Island. Chinese fishery 
vessels blocked Philippine Navy vessels from stopping Chinese 
fisherman.266 
2013 – Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei admitted PLAN 
vessels had taken “legitimate and reasonable” actions against Vietnamese 
fishing vessels in disputed waters; but Vietnam contends the vessels were 
in Vietnamese waters, and the actions included firing flares into the 
fishing vessel which subsequently caught fire.267 
2013 – Effective January 1, 2014, China issued a new fishing regulations 
that required states that seek to fish or conduct surveys in water claimed 
by China must receive approval “from relevant departments of the State 
Council.” This represents the implementation of China’s 2004 fisheries 
law, and applies to “sea areas administered by Hainan” that constitutes 
two million square kilometers of the SCS.268 
While fishing issues are not uncommon between disputant states, the Chinese 
behavior has been risk acceptant. Fravel acknowledged that a shift towards using PLAN 
assets instead of law enforcement agencies would indicate “assertiveness,” and fit within 
this thesis’ definition of risky behavior, because it is outside of the pattern China has used 
to enforce its maritime claims and incompatible with the DOC.269 The new and unilateral 
behaviors that are outside of the Chinese pattern and incompatible with the DOC include: 
the apprehension, imprisonment, and confiscation of Vietnamese and Philippine 
fishermen; the extension of the fishing ban in duration and the inclusion of foreign 
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fisherman in disputed waters; and the integration of PLAN assets with civilian agencies 
dealing with foreign civilians.270 Thayer argued the escalation of Chinese tactics, 
especially the new fishing regulations, are “aimed at extending the legal basis for China’s 
claim” are a “challenge to sovereignty” and represent a threat to stability in the SCS.271 
Fravel argued Vietnamese and Philippine responses also routinely violated Article Five 
of the DOC, but it should be noted that they appeared to increase their response—to 
include apprehension and arming civilian maritime agencies—to Chinese escalation of 
fishing conflicts.272 Comments from the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, 
“regulations escalate tensions, unnecessarily complicates the situation in the South China 
Sea and threatens the peace and stability of the region,” and Vietnam, “Vietnam demands 
that China abolish the above said erroneous acts, and practically contribute to the 
maintenance of peace and stability in the region,” after the imposition of the fishing ban 
present public criticism that points towards escalation.273 
China’s risk acceptant behavior highlighted by hydrocarbon exploration related 
actions: 
2006 – According to the SOA, MSF began law enforcement deployments 
to “protect rights.”274 
2009 – Before a U.S. Senate subcommittee on foreign relations, deputy 
assistant secretary of state testified: “Starting in the summer of 2007, 
China told a number of U.S. and foreign oil and gas firms to stop 
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exploration work with Vietnamese partners in the South China Sea or face 
unspecified consequences in their business dealings with China.”275 
2011 – Two Chinese MSF vessels “expelled” a Singapore-register French-
owned survey ship operating in the Reed Bank off of Palawan Island. The 
Philippines reported the MSF vessels shadowed the survey vessel and 
threated to ram it.276 
2011 – Three Chinese MSF vessels conducted threatening maneuvers and 
surrounded the PetroVietnam survey ship Binh Minh 02. One of the MSF 
ship cut across the stern of the Binh Minh 02 and cut its towed array 
survey cable.277 
2011 – Chinese fishing vessels and SSRFAB vessels surrounded the 
Norwegian Viking II, and one Chinese fishing vessel became entangled 
with its “special cable-slashing device” and the sonar equipment towed. 
Viking II was surveying under a contact between Talisman Energy, a 
Canadian firm, and Vietnam.278 
2012 – Two Chinese MSF vessels cut the cable of the PetroVietnam 
survey ship Binh Minh 02 while it was conducting a seismic survey 43 
NM southeast of Con Co Island which is 16 NM off of Vietnam’s Quang 
Tri province (mainland).279 
2012 – The new legislature representing the Spratlys, the Paracels the 
Macclesfield Bank, and the SCS was elected, and the Central Military 
Commission approved the deployment of a garrison of soldiers to be 
stationed at Woody Island for their protection.280 
2014 – Chinese oil rig HD-981 drilled exploratory wells within the 
disputed EEZ of Vietnam. The China National Petroleum Corporation’s 
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project Zhongjiannan was met with protests in Vietnam and interactions 
between Chinese and Vietnamese coast guard, fishery, and fishing 
vessels.281 These interactions included the Chinese fishing boat 11209 
colliding with Vietnamese fishing boat DNA 90152 causing it to sink.282 
2014 – PLAN organized a drill of ten units from PLA Naval Air Force, 
FLEC, PLA Air Force, China Coast Guard, and civilian maritime agencies 
in waters close to Vietnam that simulated a scenario of an oil rig 
surrounded and threatened by fishing vessels.283 
The disputes over hydrocarbon extraction have escalated in the SCS. The 
warnings from 2007 onwards were a signal to multinational corporations of Chinese 
intensions, and the severing of towed survey cables was the result of the disregard for 
those signals. Fravel noted that severing cables is a new and unilateral expression of 
sovereignty with “no similar incidents were reported in previous years,” and this trend of 
actions fits within risk acceptant behavior and is incompatible with the DOC.284 The 
response of a Chinese spokesperson, “The law enforcement activities by Chinese 
maritime surveillance ships against Vietnam’s illegally operating ships are completely 
justified,” confirmed that the events were government sanctioned and imply that cable 
cutting is an act to deter future exploration.285 The deployment of HD-981, the sinking of 
a Vietnamese ship objecting to HD-981, and the presence of PLAN assets appear to be 
another level of Chinese escalation. The inclusion of the PLAN into maritime interactions 
between civilian agencies, as was mentioned earlier, is another new risk acceptant 
behavior that had not be witnessed prior to HD-981. The drill combining multiple PLA 
units with civilian agencies in support of protecting an oil rig is another example of 
Chinese signaling their intensions. By incorporating the PLAN, cutting cables, and 
threatening civilian multinational corporations, China shows a clear divergence from its 
hydrocarbon concerns prior to 2006, and its actions after have been both risk acceptant 
and against the spirit of the DOC.  
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The risk acceptant behavior detailed in this section represents only a few of the 
risk acceptant behaviors of China, which regularly complicates and escalates situations 
that could result in a loss of power or standing from territorial adversaries, the US, or the 
UN. While no conflict has broken out since the taking of the Paracel Islands from 
Vietnam, Chinese behavior related to territorial claims has deviated towards 
militarization and away from self-restraint or constructive objections as set forth in 
Article Five of the DOC. The deviation towards militarization is interesting because 
militarized interactions with the U.S. regarding surveying and military deployments 
remained consistent through the entire period—SCS incidents span the 1990s until the 
present and include USNS Bowditch, the U.S. Navy EP-3, USNS Impeccable, and the 
recent USS Cowpens incident. Militarization of the SCS territorial disputes may be a 
signal that the period of risk aversion has ended, and further illustrates China’s inability 
to renormalize. 
E. APPLIED HYPOTHESIS FOUR 
Chinese behavior should show reluctance from disengaging from conflicts 
or risky behavior in the periphery, despite diminishing returns. 
As there are no ongoing conflicts in the SCS, hypothesis four is difficult to prove 
or disprove at this time. The continuation of risk acceptant behavior that leads to conflict, 
and the continuation of that conflict while facing diminishing returns would confirm 
hypothesis four. An analysis of the events surrounding the deployment of HD-981 
provides a case study illustrating that China was willing to act in a risk acceptant manner 
during a crisis in the SCS, and it would not disengage from its strategy despite the crisis 
that developed with Vietnam. This section will list the events that occurred during HD-
981’s deployment and subsequent crisis, present risk acceptant behavior, and analyze 
China’s reluctance to de-escalate the crisis.286 
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May 2, 2014 – China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) 
deploys a deep water drilling rig, the HD-981, in disputed waters near the 
Paracel Islands in the SCS. 
May 4, 2014 – China’s Maritime Safety Administration announces that all 
ships are prohibited from entering a 1.6 km radius (subsequently expanded 
to five km) surrounding an oil drilling area near the Paracel Islands until 
operations end. 
May 7, 2014 – Vietnam releases video showing Chinese ships repeatedly 
ramming and using water cannons against Hanoi’s patrol vessels in the 
area where Beijing has placed an oil rig. 
June 4, 2014 – Vietnam releases video footage showing a large Chinese 
ship chasing and ramming one of its fishing boats, which subsequently 
sank. 
June 9, 2014 – Wang Min, China’s deputy permanent representative to the 
UN, submits a position paper to UN General Secretary Ban Ki-moon 
alleging that Vietnam “illegally and forcefully disrupted the Chinese 
operation” of its oil rig in the SCS. 
June 11, 2014 – Vietnam’s mission to the UN submits a position paper for 
circulation to the General Assembly demanding that China withdraw its 
oil rig from the area in the Paracel Islands, its escort vessels from 
Vietnam’s maritime zones, and to stop “all activities that are interfering 
with maritime safety and security, and affecting regional peace and 
security.” 
June 18, 2014 – Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi visits Vietnam and 
meets Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung and Foreign Minister Pham Binh 
Minh in Hanoi to exchange views on bilateral relations and ongoing 
maritime tensions. 
July 17, 2014 – China removes its offshore oil rig from contested waters 
near the Paracel Islands, a month before schedule. 
Aug. 11, 2014 – Following the ASEAN Regional Forum, Southeast Asian 
foreign ministers issue a joint statement expressing serious concerns over 
rising tensions in the SCS and call for ASEAN to intensify consultations 
with China and have substantive discussions for the conclusion of a 
legally binding code of conduct in the SCS. 
Aug. 18, 2014 – Philippine officials publicly warn against Chinese ships 
doing oil exploration in the energy-rich Reed Bank. 
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Aug. 27, 2014 – Sino-Vietnamese talks in Beijing reach an agreement to 
avoid acts that would worsen maritime disputes and to support overall 
peace and stability in the SCS.  
Dec. 7, 2014 – Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs releases a position 
paper in response to the Philippine’s decision in January to file a case with 
the UN Permanent Court of Arbitration disputing Chinese claims in the 
SCS. The Chinese government maintains its objection to the ongoing 
arbitral proceedings. 
Dec. 11, 2014 – Vietnam submits an official statement to the UN 
Permanent Court of Arbitration as part of its dispute with China in the 
SCS. The statement asks the international court to give “due regard” to 
Hanoi’s legal rights as the court reviews a separate, impending case filed 
by the Philippines and rejects China’s “nine-dash line” demarcation of the 
SCS. 
The background to HD-981’s deployment appears to be a reaction to the 2013 the 
Philippine case, “The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China,” 
brought to the UN Permanent Court of Arbitration.287 China’s initial response to the 
Philippine arbitration request was a January, 22 2013, Note Verbale to the UN that 
contained a position paper that rejected the Philippine’s claim as a unilateral move, 
noting the bilateral instruments between China and the Philippines DOC signed by both 
China and the Philippines, “explicitly states that territorial and jurisdictional disputes 
shall be resolved peacefully by sovereign States directly concerned through friendly 
consultations and negotiations.”288 China’s basis for rejecting UN arbitration rests on the 
argument that UNCLOS does not apply to territorial sovereignty disputes—despite using 
it as a basis for its 2000 Sino-Vietnamese Agreement on Maritime Boundary Delimitation 
in the Gulf of Tonkin—and that Articles 280 and 281 from the DOC provide additional 
legal protection from UN arbitration—because they call for “no recourse to arbitration or 
other compulsory procedures.”289 As discussed in an earlier section, Hainan provincial 
leaders had previously lobbied the Hu administration state councilor who heads of 
Foreign Affairs Office Dai Binggui for an oil exploration mission, but the mission only 
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reached CPC leadership after Yang Jiechi replaced Dai and passed the HSD-981 plan to 
Xi and the maritime LSG after the 12th NPC in March 2013.290 In the context of the 
Philippine challenge to China’s territorial reference point of the area of the SCS, China is 
facing potential losses and should act in a risk acceptant manner. Fravel noted a similar 
pattern when investigating the cable cutting incidents, he observed that the incidents of 
cable cutting “incidents occurred after survey activity by other claimants increased.”291 
HD-981 was deployed to 15°29’58’’ north latitude and 111°12’06’’ east longitude 
on May 2, 2014 within the claimed EEZ of Vietnam illustrated in Figure 5, and the 
purpose of this deployment was to exercise Chinese territorial claims.292 
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Figure 6.  Map of Vietnam and Malaysia Baseline Claims (2009)293 
Figure 7 illustrates location of HD-981 and the maximum potential continental 
shelf of the Paracel Islands under UNCLOS. HD-981’s position inside of a potential 
Chinese occupied Paracel Islands generated EEZ would assume the islands received 
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preference over the EEZ of the Vietnamese coast which would be inconsistent with 
international law. While HD-981 may be within an EEZ of Triton Island, it is unclear 
whether this EEZ would extend to HD-981’s position because the countering claims have 
not been settled. 
 
Figure 7.  Location of HD-981 with red area indicating the maximum EEZ of 
the Paracel Islands 
The first associated example of risk acceptant behavior from the deployment of 
HD-981 was the engagement of Vietnamese fishing and patrol vessels and the eventual 
sinking of a Vietnamese vessel.294 Vietnamese video evidence illustrates aggressive 
actions that ultimately led to the sinking can viewed as a violation of the 1972 
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
(COLREGS) Convention known as the “Rules of the Road” that is a binding treaty 
signed by both China and Vietnam and applies to “all vessels upon the high seas and in 
all waters connected therewith navigable by seagoing vessels.”295 Aggressive maneuvers 
by Chinese and Vietnamese vessels also violated the DOC pledge by all states to 
“exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate 
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disputes and affect peace and stability.”296 In violating the DOC, China undermined their 
basis for rejecting UN arbitration with the Philippines because they based their case on 
the DOC agreement. 
Vietnamese media also reported that multiple PLAN ships including two Type 
071 LPDs and one Type 053H3 frigate were part of the flotilla which accompanied HD-
981, and this claim was bolstered by the Chinese state media reporting that a Fuchi-class 
replenishment ship was on patrol in the area near HD-981.297 Interactions with 
Vietnamese fishing or coast guard vessels is usually handled by CMS or SSRFAB 
vessels, rather than conventional naval forces, and the integration of PLAN assets into the 
HD-981 mission is another example of risk acceptant behavior. 
After displaying risk acceptant behavior, China was reluctant to disengage from 
their mission despite Vietnamese backlash. Within days of the deployment of HD-981, 
rare anti-Chinese protestors took to the streets of Hanoi, Danang, and Ho Chi Minh City, 
which culminated in the burning of properties believed to be owned by Chinese 
corporations in the Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Parks I & II in Binh Duong.298 HD-
981’s deployment also caused Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh to 
publically contact Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi on May 6, 2015 and demand that 
HD-981 and ships operating with violated Vietnam’s sovereignty and they should be 
removed from Vietnam’s territory.299 Additionally, representatives from the Vietnamese 
foreign ministry met with representatives from the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi to deliver a 
ministerial diplomatic note that called for the “immediately withdraw the drilling rig, 
vessels, equipment and personnel from Lot 143 in Viet Nam’s continental shelf and 
prevent the recurrence of similar acts.”300 Vietnamese protests reached the level that 
China was forced to charter a flight evacuating 290 Chinese nationals—including 100 
injured—and send ships to evacuate another 7,000 in the following days. Tensions 
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increased enough that Vietnam’s mission to the UN submitted a position paper to the UN 
General Assembly demanding that China withdraw its oil rig from the area in the Paracel 
Islands on June 11, 2014. Tensions only decreased after Chinese State Councilor Yang 
Jiechi visited Vietnam to personally meet with Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung and 
Deputy Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh to discuss bilateral relations in June. At the 
regional level, the increased tensions caused the August 2014 ARF to publically issue a 
joint statement expressing concerns and calling for renewed efforts to sign the COC in 
the SCS. HD-981’s withdraw from its operating area occurred on July 15, well after the 
crisis de-escalated and in advance of the Typhoon Rammasun which was on a path that 
would have encountered HD-981.301 
China’s reluctance to remove HD-981 and stop its risk acceptant strategy was 
made clear in the de-escalation of the crisis. While HD-981 was removed one month 
ahead of schedule, it was not removed in response to any bi-lateral negotiations or de-
escalatory concession by China. Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi did travel to 
Vietnam to meet with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh, 
Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, and Communist Party chief Nguyen Phu Trong 
towards the end of the crisis in late June 2014.302 Dung argued that Vietnam “cannot 
trade our sacred independence and sovereignty for some elusive peace or any type of 
dependence;” however, Yang responded by accusing Vietnam of “hyping up” the 
situation and said China would “take all necessary measures” to protect HD-981.303 
China was able to deescalate the crisis by exposing a rift in Vietnam’s senior leadership 
and force an accommodating stance. Following Yang’s departure, the Politburo met to 
formulate a response with two groups emerging favoring different responses to the crisis. 
Dung and Nguyen Sinh Hung, the Chairman of the National Assembly, led one group 
that included Ho Chi Minh City’s Party Chief Le Thanh Hai, Deputy Prime Minister 
Nguyen Xuan Phuc, and the deputy chairmen of the National Assembly Nguyen Thi Kim 
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Ngan and Thong Thi Phong.304 The group presented a multi-faceted strategy that took a 
confrontational and hardline approach including: filing a brief with the International 
Arbitration Commission that paralleled the 2014 Philippine brief, pushing ASEAN 
towards a binding COC for the SCS, and increasing military and trade engagement with 
the US, India, Indonesia, Japan, and the Philippines by conducting multilateral military 
exercises and joining the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP).305 A de-escalation group 
formed that opposed these confrontational measures led by Trong and included a member 
of the Party’s Secretariat To Huy Ru’a, Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) Secretariat Le 
Hong Anh, Chair Central Committee for Inspection Ngo Van Du, Propaganda and 
Education Commission Dinh The Huyen, Hanoi Party Chief Pham Quang Nghi, 
Chairman of Vietnam Fatherland Front Nguyen Thien Nhan, and the Minister for Public 
Security Tran Dai Quang.306 The two leading politicians which sided with the de-
escalation camp and dictated the outcome were President Truong Tan Sang and Minister 
of National Defense Phung Quang Thanh.307 The Politburo’s decision to de-escalate the 
crisis over HD-981 stopped the filing of a Vietnamese arbitration case at the UN, 
although Vietnam did request ‘due regard’ as the court reviewed the case brought by the 
Philippines. Additionally, Foreign Minister Minh canceled a scheduled trip to 
Washington, D.C., to meet with U.S. Secretary of State Kerry to discuss regional security 
issues.308 
China’s ability to force de-escalation was based on two major factors. First, the 
economic costs of confrontation was too high, as China remains Vietnam’s largest 
trading partner accounting for over 50 billion dollar in bilateral trade in 2013.309 Second, 
if China refused to back down, even a limited military conflict would be costly for 
Vietnam in terms of casualties and prestige. In his book on contemporary Vietnam 
Shadows and Wind, Robert Templer depicted the “overwhelming emphasis of official 
                                                 







Vietnamese history as resistance, almost always against China.”310 Templer argues that 
the fear of Chinese domination has entrenched defensiveness in Vietnamese identity, and 
textbooks with stories of national heroes who fought China.311 At this point, the potential 
cost of prestige from another battle lost over the Paracel Islands, does not appear to be 
worth the temporary infringement on sovereignty or potential hydrocarbon resources. 
The case study illustrates the reluctance of China to de-escalate or stop risk 
acceptant strategies despite diminished returns. Vietnam and China reached an agreement 
to avoid future maritime disputes and support peace, but only after China identified and 
exploited a rift between the Vietnamese leadership, used its economic and military 
leverage to force de-escalation, avoided bi-lateral dispute resolution mechanisms from 
DOC, risked conflict with Vietnam, and undermined its own objection to Philippine 
arbitration. China’s behavior soured relations with Vietnam and caused it to submit an 
official statement to the UN Permanent Court of Arbitration that requested ‘due regard’ 
as the court reviewed the Philippine case against China’s nine-dashed line claims in the 
SCS. 
F. NULL HYPOTHESIS 
Chinese leaders should maintain a static risk acceptance level in the SCS, 
despite changes to relative power, expectation levels, the length of time 
expectation levels are maintained, or the success/failure of on-going 
strategies. 
The evidence presented for applied hypotheses one through four is useful for 
rejecting the null hypothesis and proving that Chinese leaders’ risk acceptance has varied 
over time. Applied hypothesis one argued that the lead up to the 2009 deadline for 
submissions to the UNCLOS CLCS threatened to decrease the relative status of China in 
the SCS, and the perceived systemic pressures caused Chinese leaders to choose a 
favorable reference point illustrated by the nine-dashed line map. Applied hypothesis two 
argued that Chinese leaders have anchored on a reference point of their nine-dashed line 
                                                 




claim and rejected any renormalization that relinquishes territory in the SCS. This is 
shown most clearly by the delaying strategy surrounding the COC. Applied hypothesis 
three showed that observed fishing and hydrocarbon related incidents observed prior to 
the 2006 lead up to UNCLOS CLCS were less risk acceptant, and that after 2006 China 
was willing to pursue a risk acceptant strategy. Finally, applied hypothesis four, 
regarding the deployment of HD-981, provides a case study illustrating that China was 
willing to act in a risk acceptant manner during a crisis in the SCS, and it would not 
disengage from its strategy despite the crisis that developed with Vietnam. 
The evidence presented in support of the arguments of this thesis illustrated that 
China displayed a distinct shift in its risk acceptance in 2006 leading up to the 2009 
UNCLOS CLCS deadline, and thus the null hypothesis can be rejected. 
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This thesis attempted to answer the questions: does Chinese behavior follow the 
balance-of-risk hypotheses? If so, what are the implications of balance-of-risk theory for 
our understanding of Chinese actions in the SCS? And, what does the balance-of-risk tell 
us about policy response during crisis? In order to answer these questions, balance-of-risk 
theory was presented and applied to recent Chinese behavior in the SCS. Balance-of-risk 
theory posits that leaders make decisions based on a reference point framed by their 
perceived relative power and international standing, that leaders indicate their reference 
point through public documents and statements, and that leaders will make risk averse 
policy decisions when they are in the domain of gains and risk acceptant policy decisions 
when they face potential losses to their perceived reference point. By proving Chinese 
behavior in the SCS conforms to the theses from the balance-of-risk theory, U.S., 
Southeast Asian, and East Asian policy makers are offered a perspective that could help 
understand and explain Chinese behavior. 
B. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE APPLIED THESES 
The four applied hypothesis argued that China does follow the behavior predicted 
by the balance-of-risk theory. Applied hypothesis one identified perceived systemic 
pressures from the lead up to the 2009 deadline for submissions to the UNCLOS CLCS 
caused Chinese leaders to choose a favorable reference point illustrated by the nine-
dashed line map. Applied hypothesis two found that Chinese leaders have anchored on a 
reference point of the nine-dashed line claim and rejected renormalization through 
arbitration or even a COC for the SCS because they could cause the relinquishment of 
claimed territory. Applied hypothesis three observed a change trend of fishing and 
hydrocarbon related incidents. Prior to the 2006 lead up to UNCLOS CLCS China 
appeared less risk acceptant, but after 2006 China appeared willing to pursue a risk 
acceptant strategy when dealing with fishing or hydrocarbon incidents. Finally, applied 
hypothesis four analyzed a case study of the deployment of HD-981 and the Chinese 
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response that demonstrated a reluctance to disengage from its risk acceptant strategy 
despite the crisis that developed with Vietnam. 
The balance-of-risk theory could be further confirmed if the following actions 
were to occur: the formalization of the SCS as a Chinese core interest on the same level 
as Taiwan, Tibet, or Xinjiang, the continued increase in the use of military assets when 
asserting sovereignty, responding to fishing or hydrocarbon incidents, and small scale 
conflicts with military assets of other disputants, or the forceful taking of a disputed 
island. At this point, the anchored Chinese reference point appears to include the entirety 
of the islands, reefs, and waters covered by the nine-dashed line, and this thesis argues 
that any increase in internationally forced systemic pressures surrounding the sovereignty 
of the areas within the nine-dashed line would further threaten the Chinese position 
placing China into a domain of losses. Within this framework, balance-of-risk theory is a 
useful tool for evaluating future risk acceptant behavior. Future research could compare 
the behavior of the other disputant states, 
C. FUTURE EXPECTATIONS OF CHINESE BEHAVIOR 
The conclusions developed by examining Chinese behavior against the balance-
of-risk theory provide a new mechanism that leaders could use to approach diplomacy in 
the SCS. With regard to the question if China can rise peacefully, balance-of-risk theory 
suggests that the settlement of the SCS disputes would cause risk acceptant behavior that 
would likely lead to conflict if China is placed in the domain of losses as a result of the 
arbitration. China’s risk acceptant behavior after 2006 is a good example of assertiveness, 
and it indicates that China can be viewed as revisionist in the SCS. China’s unwillingness 
to settle disputes with the international community through mature institutions, such as 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the UN or the ARF’s DOC, and its desire to rely 
solely on bi-lateral negotiations is an indication that China wishes to reform at least some 
of the institutions of the current international system. These conclusions reject the 
arguments from the economic interdependency theories, but the broadly support the 
English School and neorealist arguments. China’s assertive and revisionist behavior 
could be viewed as indications of a desire to achieve regional hegemony. Alternatively, 
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they could be viewed as frustrations from the two-way process as China and other world 
powers work out accommodations that make room for China’s new status. Within both of 
these overarching theories, the balance-of-risk thesis can be used as a predictor of 
behavior until China’s place in the international system is solidified. 
D. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON THE BALANCE-OF-RISK 
THESIS 
While discussing China’s approach to the Sino-Japanese disputed Senkaku 
Islands leading up to the 1978 peace treaty, Deng described China’s delaying strategy: “It 
doesn’t matter if this question is shelved for some time, say ten years. Our generation is 
not wise enough to find common language on this question. Our next generation will 
certainly be wiser. They will certainly find a solution acceptable to all.”312 Xi’s decision 
to modify Deng’s ‘20-character policy’ in favor of a more activist role in foreign affairs 
has complicated the SCS disputes, and it appears as though Xi’s generation is attempting 
to find the common language that leads to resolution. This final section will address U.S. 
policy and the implications from the balance-of-risk theory applied to the change in 
Chinese foreign policy. 
The Washington-based Federally Funded Research and Development Center 
(FFRDC) Center for Naval Analysis summarized the U.S. policy on the SCS, with a basis 
in Congressional testimony and public statements from serving U.S. senior officials, as: 
No use of force or coercion by any of the claimants to resolve sovereignty 
disputes or change the status-quo of disputed South China Sea features. 
Freedom of navigation, which includes unimpeded lawful navigation for 
commercial, private and military vessels and aircraft. Coastal states must 
respect the UNCLOS language that all “high seas freedoms” are 
applicable to military operations in the EEZs of coastal states. 
All maritime entitlements to any of the waters of the South China Sea 
must be based on international law and must be derived from land features 
in the South China Sea. China’s nine-dash line does not meet these 
criteria. In short, only land (islands and rocks) generate maritime zones, 
not vice versa. 
                                                 
312 Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, 271. 
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The United States takes no position on the relative merits of competing 
sovereignty claims. It does not choose sides; nor does it favor one 
country’s claim over another’s. 
An effective Code of Conduct that would promote a rules-based 
framework for managing and regulating the behavior of relevant countries 
in the South China Sea is essential. A key part of such a document would 
be mechanisms such as hotlines and emergency procedures for preventing 
incidents in sensitive areas and managing them when they do occur in 
ways that prevent disputes from escalating. 
The United States supports internationally recognized dispute resolution 
mechanisms, including those provided for in the UNCLOS treaty. 
Washington will respond positively to small South China Sea littoral 
countries that are U.S. allies, officially designated “strategic partners,” or 
“comprehensive partners,” who want to improve their ability to patrol and 
monitor their own territorial waters and EEZs. 
The U.S. government wants to improve access for U.S. military in areas 
proximate to the South China Sea.313 
These policies are a reflection of some longstanding U.S. positions and the 
continue of the strategic pivot to Asia, which Secretary of State John Kerry recently 
reiterated is “a top priority for every one of us in [Obama’s] administration.”314 
Analyzing these policies against the findings of the balance-of-risk theory leads to a few 
interesting observations. First, not taking a position in the sovereignty claims eases the 
Chinese perceived threat to its positions, but at the same time not recognizing the nine-
dashed line and supporting arbitration increases the perceived challenge. Second, 
supporting SCS littoral countries who are strategic partners or comprehensive partners in 
their patrols of their claimed territorial waters and EEZs places the U.S. into a position 
where it could be involved in a Chinese risk acceptant display of sovereignty. The USNS 
Impeccable, USNS Bowditch, EP-3, and more recent USS Cowpens incidents are 
examples that show that China is willing to display sovereignty despite U.S. presence. 
Finally, advocating for UNCLOS and its dispute resolution mechanisms is flawed in two 
                                                 
313 McDevitt, “South China Sea,” v-vi. 
314 Gopal Ratnam and Kate Brannen, “Against Other Threats, Obama’s Security Budget Sticks to 
Asia-Pacific Pivot,” Foreign Policy, February 2, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/02/793982budget-
asia-pacific-syria-iraq-russia-ukraine/. 
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parts: the U.S. has not ratified UNCLOS, and China does not recognize the dispute 
resolution mechanisms. Any attempt to support partners in their attempts at using 
international institutions to force arbitration will result in more risk acceptant Chinese 
behavior. 
If the U.S. desired a policy that would reduce the current tensions and risk 
acceptant Chinese behavior, the balance-of-risk theory provides some suggestions. The 
first option would be to retain the status quo, and to not force arbitration or any other 
position that threatens the Chinese position. The second option would be to support the 
renouncing of claims in return for some form of equitable concessions; examples could 
include financial settlements or economic preferences in terms of trade or loans. Other 
areas of potential traction for resolving disputes could be focused on non-security related 
cooperation. Strategies that focus on institutional inclusion, especially in the economic 
sector, could increase the costs of conflict with China and any of the disputant states. 
Raising the cost of even limited conflict by providing cooperative institutional benefits, 
one example would be to maintaining the original “res nullius” classification and create a 
cooperative zone of resource extraction by all of the disputants, could provide a 
mechanism that preserves the status quo. 
In closing, SCS disputes are complicated by a long history of conflicting claims, 
militarized disputes, and financial benefits from natural resources, and leaders have used 
nationalism, historic ties, and international institutions to bolster their positions in a zero 
sum sovereignty game. International relations theorists have yet to form a consensus, and 
they provide numerous positions and policy recommendations. This thesis analyzed 
Chinese behavior against the balance-of-risk theory, and argued that it provides a 
mechanism to understand and predict future Chinese actions. 
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